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ABSTRACT

A puzzling correlation has been observed over the last thirty years between slow or
negative economic growth and countries with large export dependence on natural resources. This
correlation has been dubbed “the resource curse.” It has been argued that resource wealth has an
inherently negative effect on the economic growth of developing countries. Zambia is such a
country in which resource-dependence has been coupled with poor economic performance;
Botswana, however, is an important exception to this phenomenon. The question is: Why or how
has Botswana surmounted the effects of the resource curse while Zambia has not? A comparative
case analysis using Mill’s method of agreement has been used in this study to assess this
question. A variety of causal mechanisms have been proposed to explain this correlation. Among
them are: (1) declining terms of trade, (2) commodity price volatility, (3) the enclaved nature of
the mining industry, (4) Dutch disease, (5) the implementation of poor resource rents
management policies, (6) the presence of weak state institutions, (7) the presence of rent-seeking
and corruption, (8) the development of authoritarian regimes, and (9) the presence of social
conflict. Of these nine hypotheses, those advancing commodity price volatility, the nature of
rents-management policies, the strength or weakness of state institutions, the degree of rentseeking and corruption, and the extent of social conflict as causal variables are found to be most
important in accounting for the difference in outcomes between these two cases.
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1: Introduction

Mining has always played an important economic role in the developing economies of Africa, as
it has in many other developing countries. In the 2007-2008 United Nations Human
Development Report, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa received, on average, 66% of their
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the trade or export of primary products, such as mineral
ores. This high dependence on the export of primary products, particularly resources such as oil
and minerals, is concerning. A puzzling correlation has been observed between slow or negative
economic growth and countries with large export dependency on natural resources. This
correlation is known as “the resource curse.”
It has been argued that resource wealth has an inherently negative effect on the economic
growth of developing countries, and in some instances it has even been argued that resource-rich
countries would be better off ignoring their subterranean capital. However, there are a few
exceptions to this correlation and these exceptions lead to the question: do these exceptions
reveal possible paths out of the resource curse? If so, then the more revealing question becomes:
Why or how do some resource-rich, resource-dependant countries overcome the effects of the
resource curse, while most do not? Pertinent to this question, and to Sub-Saharan Africa in
particular, are the cases of Zambia and Botswana. Botswana appears to be one of the few
exceptions to the resource curse correlation, while Zambia appears to be one of the many
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victims. Hence the final research question: Why or how has Botswana surmounted the effects of
the resource curse while Zambia has not?
A comparative study between these two countries is especially useful in analyzing this
question. This type of study will expand on research already conducted and hypotheses already
developed on the resource curse phenomenon. As Lay and Mahmoud (2004) note, the types of
studies that have typically been conducted on the resource curse have been large-N statistical
studies conducting regression analysis to establish correlations between selected independent
variables and economic growth, or single-case studies to provide in-depth explanations of the
causal mechanism within one country. Lay and Mahmoud (2004, 32) identify the limits to their
own regression analysis and state that “future research should focus on detailed comparative
country studies.” The multivariate difficulties in statistical studies, such as multicollinearity, with
which Lay and Mahmoud are concerned, can be overcome by a comparative case study such as
that conducted here between Zambia and Botswana.
The cases of Zambia and Botswana have been selected to approximate Mill’s method of
agreement. Within case process-tracing is also used. These methods are employed to test the
current hypotheses found in the resource curse literature and identify the critical variables that
account for the differences between the two cases. These cases have been chosen as proposed
“most similar” cases. Ideally, most similar cases require that “all aspects are held constant except
for the one whose explanatory power we would like to assess empirically” (Heritier 2008, 67).
These two countries are similar in many respects. They are similar with regard to region and
geography. Both are located in Southern Africa, and share a vague border at the Zambezi River
to Zambia’s southwest and to Botswana’s northeast. Both countries are landlocked and relatively

2

close in geographic size. Zambia is 752,614 square kilometers and Botswana is 600,370 square
kilometers.
As a result of their geographical proximity, Zambia and Botswana have experienced
similar regional geopolitical pressures, such as their proximity to the formerly, militaristic whitesettler dominated states of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Another similarity derives from
their colonial histories. Both countries were administered by the British. Zambia, or Northern
Rhodesia, was a territory of the South Africa Company until the British government took control
of the colony in 1924. Botswana was a protectorate of the British government. Both gained
independence within two years of one another, Zambia in 1964 and Botswana in 1966. Also,
since independence both countries have instituted constitutional democracies and hybrid forms
of the British parliamentary and American presidential systems. Elections have been held in both
countries since independence. One difference emerges in regard to population; Zambia’s
population is significantly larger than the population of Botswana—by about ten times. The
population of Zambia was estimated at 12.6 million in 2008 while Botswana’s population was
estimated at 1.9 million in the same year.
The most important similarity, however, is that both countries are mineral dependent
developing economies in which one product, copper in Zambia and diamonds in Botswana,
accounted for 70% or more of total exports on average from 1990 to 1999. The important
difference on the dependent variable is that while Botswana has experienced a 2.53% average
annual growth in GDP over 1990 to 1999, Zambia has experienced a negative 2.3% average
annual decline in GDP (Liebenthal, Mitchelistch, and Tarazona 2005). The similarity in
dependence and contrast in GDP growth can be seen in table 1.1. As a result of these
geographical, historical, political and mineral dependency similarities, these two cases are
3

presented as most similar cases and offer a potentially fruitful comparison for those concerned
with the questions posed by the resource-curse literature.
Table 1.1: Percentage of GDP Growth by Year and the Percentage of Mineral
Exports of Total Exports

Zambia
GDP (%yr)1

1970-74

1975-79

1980-84

1985-89

1990-94

1995-99

2000-04

3.9

-0.6

0.8

2.1

-0.8

1.5

4.5

Mining share
of total
exports (%)2
Botswana
GDP (%yr)

74

19.9

11.5

11.0

11.9

Mining share
of total
exports (%)
1
2

1990-99

4.5

7.6

6.2
70

Source: Auty 2008 Annex Table 3
Source: World Bank 2005 Annex C Attachment 2

The differences found between these two countries provide tests for the hypotheses
offered by previous research on the resource curse. There are many prominent hypotheses
arguing about what best explains the correlation between resource dependence and poor
economic growth. These can be divided into two categories. The first category places emphasis
on economic factors as predominant causes of poor growth, while the second places emphasis on
political factors. Within the economic category there are at least four hypotheses: (1) declining
terms of trade, (2) commodity price volatility, (3) low external linkages of the mineral industry,
and (4) the Dutch disease. The political category includes the following five hypotheses: (1)
mismanagement of resource rents, (2) weak political institutions, (3) rent-seeking and corruption,
(4) regime type, and (5) social conflict. These nine hypotheses, along with brief discussions of
their relevance for each country, are presented in section 2. There then follows an in-depth
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analysis of Zambia’s resource-dependent experience in section 3, which is replicated for
Botswana in section 4. The hypotheses will be examined and compared against each case.
As will be shown in section 3, Zambia has experienced to varying degrees the
mechanisms identified by all of the economic hypotheses of the resource curse with the
exception of the first hypothesis regarding declining terms of trade and the last regarding the
Dutch disease. The volatility of the international copper market was the most influential of the
mechanisms identified by economic resource curse hypotheses. The Zambian government
implemented policies assuming that copper prices and the government revenue derived from
those prices would remain stable. As a result, when copper prices fell suddenly the government
was left unprepared, and revenue dropped while debt increased. As for the third hypothesis
regarding the weak linkages between the mining industry and the surrounding economy, Zambia
has seen the development of an enclave economy with few spin-offs from the copper industry to
other sectors. Surprisingly, however, evidence that Zambia has suffered from the Dutch disease
is inconclusive.
The economic resource curse hypotheses explain only part of Zambia’s failure to escape
the resource curse; the political hypotheses provide the greater part of the explanation. The first
political hypothesis references the policies created to manage and use resource rents as the causal
link between resource dependency and poor economic growth. In Zambia the government’s
policies of import substitution, nationalization, “Zambianization,” and minerals taxation all
impeded the government’s effective use of mineral rents. Similarly, the privatization policy
implemented after the commencement of economic reforms in the 1990s was also a case of
mismanagement of the mining industry, undermining its potential to be a revenue generator for
the state. While these policies of the Zambian government were detrimental to the country’s
5

economic growth, its weak institutions, such as the bureaucracy, are also part of the explanation.
Rent-seeking and corruption, the third political hypothesis, are related to Zambia’s poor
institutional quality. Zambia has suffered from rent-seeking groups such as regional-tribal
groups, and unions. Corruption has also been commonplace. The formation of an authoritarian
regime predicted by the political hypotheses occurred in Zambia to a degree; the country’s
leaders did institute a one-party state and used authoritarian-like tactics on occasion to repress
opposition. But authoritarianism in Zambia followed a different logic than that proposed by
hypothesis eight and it was not the cause of Zambia’s economic decline. Lastly, Zambia has
experienced mild instances of social conflict such as riots, but they did not significantly affect its
economy. More significantly, Zambia has had no civil wars or militaristic takeovers. Hence,
Zambia has experienced to varying degrees most of the political consequences of the resource
curse hypothesized in the resource curse literature.
Botswana, as will be shown in section 4, has not suffered from declining terms of trade as
predicted by the first economic hypothesis, or from price instability as predicted by the second
economic hypothesis. Fortunately for Botswana, the international diamond market is different
from most other commodities in that diamond prices remain relatively stable. But regardless of
its stable diamond rents, the country has experienced to a small extent the difficulty of
overcoming the enclaved nature of its diamond industry, as is posited by the third economic
hypothesis. The low employment generated by the mineral sector in Botswana is one indication
of that problem. Botswana has also experienced the negative effects of the Dutch disease - the
final economic hypothesis - in the atrophy of its agricultural sector. But despite the presence of
an enclaved mineral sector and Dutch disease in the agricultural sector, Botswana has not
experienced slow or negative economic growth as suggested by these hypotheses.
6

Regardless of its enclaved minerals sector and some experience of the Dutch disease,
Botswana has had greater success than Zambia in managing its resource rents through good
policies, strong institutions, almost non-existent rent-seeking, low levels of corruption, and an
almost complete absence of social conflict. Botswana’s political institutions are technically
democratic, but the country has evolved an increasingly authoritarian power structure with the
growing strength of the presidential office. Regarding its rent management policies, Botswana
established foreign currency reserve funds, managed its currency appreciation, employed
expatriate experts, and established various parastatals to absorb resource rents and invest them in
other sectors of its economy. Botswana also developed strong bureaucratic organizations to
underpin these policies. While there have been a few recent cases of government corruption,
Botswana has not suffered from endemic corruption and patronage; similarly the country has not
been pressured by or succumbed to rent-seeking, contrary to what the third political hypothesis
would predict. The presidency has become increasingly powerful due to the uncontested power
of the main party, the Botswana Democratic Party, which might appear to fulfill the expectations
of the fourth political hypothesis regarding authoritarianism. But the resistance to rent-seeking
by the BDP, coupled with the strength of state institutions, has actually helped the economy as
opposed to hurting it. Social conflict in Botswana is simply non-existent, with only one notable
riot having occurred in the history of the nation.
The comparison of Zambia and Botswana reveal that both countries experienced to
differing degrees the difficulties created by the enclaved nature of their vibrant mineral sectors,
and the increasingly authoritarian nature of their political institutions. The variables that differed
between these cases were price stability, the Dutch disease, economic policy, institutional
strength, rent-seeking, and social conflict, as well ass the dynamics created by their interaction.
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Zambia fell victim to the resource curse because the price of its primary mineral export, copper,
was much more volatile than that of Botswana’s diamonds, and its poor rent management
policies, institutional weakness, instances of rent-seeking and corruption, and the nation’s
conflict-generating social foundations left it unable to overcome the economic consequences of
resource-dependence. Botswana, on the other hand, despite detrimental Dutch disease effects in
its agricultural sector, could stave off the problems associated with the resource curse because of
the stability of the international diamond market, its effective economic policies, strong
institutions, limited rent-seeking and corruption, and strong social foundations. These differences
demarcate two distinct types of resource-dependent states. Those like Zambia, which have a
fragmented social system with a variety of social and interest groups which are politically active
and engaged in rent-seeking, also have volatile policy and institutional environments. In the
Zambian case, political instability is coupled with copper price instability, which interacts
negatively with the country’s difficult socio-political circumstances. Mauritania is a similar
example. A second type of resource-dependent states, like Botswana, have relatively
homogenous social bases with very few social or interest groups which are politically active or
rent-seeking, and therefore also have stable policy and institutional environments. The United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait are also in this category. The case of Botswana is also assisted by its
resource type which has very stable price streams.
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2: Resource Curse Hypotheses and their Relevance for Zambia and Botswana
Prior to in-depth analyses of Zambia and Botswana and the resource curse in sections 3 and 4, in
this section each of the nine major hypotheses found in the resource curse literature, is specified.
Also in this section a brief discussion will assess the validity of the explanation offered by each
hypothesis for the Zambian and Botswanan cases. The purpose is to set out the different factors
that may account for Zambia’s relative economic failure compared to Botswana’s relative
economic success. The interaction of these factors will be examined in the more detailed
explorations of each of the two country’s development trajectories presented in sections 3 and 4.

2.1 Economic Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: Declining Terms of Trade
Primary product exports experience falling prices relative to the prices of manufactured goods
causing the slow economic growth of primary product exporters.

Economic explanations for the resource curse are prominent in the literature. Such explanations
began with the arguments of the development economist Raul Prebisch in the 1950s. Prebisch
argued against the classical economic view that a country can achieve economic growth through
the development of any export industry. He argued that there is a downward trend in the terms of
trade for primary commodities in relation to manufactured goods. This argument is the basis
9

behind dependency theory, and resulted in the adoption of import substitution policies by
developing countries after World War II in order to protect themselves from the feared effects of
primary product-led development. The problem with this explanation of the resource curse
phenomenon is that the overall price trends of copper and diamonds (and primary resources in
general) are not negative; however, prices, especially of copper, tend to fluctuate.

Hypothesis 2: Commodity Price Volatility
Primary commodity prices are volatile, producing unstable government revenue.

The second economic explanation for the resource curse hinges on the effects of price volatility
that is quite common in mineral markets. Price volatility is thought to affect the ability of
governments to use their mineral rents successfully. As Daniel (1992) argues, because mineral
prices often oscillate, it is difficult for governments to predict prices and therefore plan for
changes in government revenues gained from mineral extraction. He states that, “Governments in
mineral-exporting countries find themselves in the position of seeking to maximize windfall
receipts from mineral exports and then confronting the economic consequences of the alternate
presence and absence of these same windfalls.” The effects of primary price volatility are evident
in both Botswana and Zambia. Both countries are highly dependent on their respective mineral
exports for government revenue; consequently changes in prices have affected total government
revenue and debt.
The effects of price volatility have been much more pronounced in Zambia. “Zambia
sells its copper at prices based on the London Metal Exchange (LME) prices…The LME price of
copper is subject to extreme, short-run fluctuations” (Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981, 11).
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The copper market has experienced vast fluctuations in price since the 1970s. From the mid1970s to the mid-1980s the average price was less than half the average attained in the preceding
ten years (Radetzki 1985). Copper prices then rose in the mid-1980s only to fall again until the
mid-1990s. This price instability has been felt acutely by the government of Zambia through
decreased revenue. It has been shown that changes in the price of copper have accounted for
“over 75 percent of the deviation of revenues from trend growth path” (Obidegwu and
Nziramasanga 1981, 183). As a result of copper price fluctuation, it became increasingly difficult
for the Zambian government to fund its entrenched spending habits in times of low copper
prices, resulting in an increasingly negative balance of payments. Revenue in 1970 was 251
million kwacha, which fell to 56 million kwacha in 1972, and by 1977 government debt had
risen to 950 million kwacha (O’Faircheallaigh 1984). The continuous decline in the copper price
required Zambia to begin a back and forth relationship with the International Financial
Institutions over its inability to meet its debt requirements after 1973.
In direct contrast to the instability of copper prices on the world market, diamond prices
have been relatively stable, dropping briefly only in the early 1980s and most recently since the
onset of the global recession in 2008. The reason for this stability lies in large part with the
ability of De Beers to control diamond output and ultimately diamond prices. As Auty (2008, 5)
puts it, “Botswana was a beneficiary of De Beers’ monopolistic management of price stability in
the diamond market, a unique advantage among mineral exporting countries.” The price stability
of diamonds under the De Beers cartel has allowed the government of Botswana to maintain a
healthy balance of payments. The government’s revenue has increased every year since
independence. In 1972 government revenue was pula 19.3 million, of which 5% was due to
mineral revenue, increasing to P 802.9 million in 1985, of which 47% was due to mineral
11

revenue and in 1995 revenue had reached P 4,492.5 million, of which 51% was due to mineral
revenues (Gaolathe 1997). This advantage improved the fiscal policy capacity of the government
(Auty 2008) and also allowed it to formulate more certain economic plans for the future.

Hypothesis 3: Weak External Linkages of the Mining Industry
The mining industry does not stimulate other sectors of the economy, preventing spin-off growth
in other sectors.

The third economic explanation looks at the nature of the extractive industry itself. This
explanation argues that the mining industry itself is not conducive to the creation of broader
economic growth. Power argues that “mining investments cannot by themselves stimulate
sustained economic development” (2002, 33). Davis and Tilton summarize the reasons why
mining is believed to be unable to generate sustained economic development by pointing to three
characteristics of the mining industry: the highly specialized nature of inputs required by the
mining industry, the high level of capital required for investment in the industry, and the
relatively low level of jobs created directly by mining. As a result of these characteristics “the
host country gets little from mining besides the monetary benefits flowing from the corporate
taxation and royalties” (Davis and Tilton 2005, 236). This characteristic of mineral wealth is
accurately captured by the term “enclave,” which refers to the low level of forward and/or
backward linkages required by a minerals industry. “Since it is not the result of a production
process, the generation of natural resource wealth can occur quite independently of other
economic processes that take place in a country” (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007, 4). In this
way, the independent nature of the minerals sector does not promote broader economic growth in
12

the same way as the development of a strong manufacturing sector is presumed to do. In both
Zambia and Botswana, attempts to use the mineral sector as a springboard for the growth of nonmining sectors have been difficult to achieve, as demonstrated by their high levels of mineraldependency.
The enclave nature of the Zambian mining industry has led to the emergence of a dual
(mining industry-subsistence agriculture) economy in Zambia. The mining industry in Zambia
was established some 40 years before the country gained its independence in 1964, while mineral
prospecting was conducted well before, in the late 1800s, under the direction of Cecil Rhodes
and the British South Africa Company. This led to the creation of a highly-industrialized mineral
sector that was surrounded by rural subsistence agriculture. The narrow industrial base supported
by the mining industry included manufacturers tailored to supplying the mineral sector. This
supports the observation by Burdette that “although the enclave itself demonstrated industrial
integration, the economy as a whole did not fit together in a way to encourage spillover effects or
economic self-reliance” (1988, 82). The Zambian economy developed industries that supplied
inputs for the mining companies such as “chemicals, basic metal products, machinery,
explosives, copper wire and cable, and sulphuric acid” (O’Faircheallaigh 1984, 135). Also as a
result of the highly-developed mining sector, Zambia developed some means of transportation
and energy provisions for that sector. However, what was obvious was the continued dependence
of most Zambians on subsistence agriculture, and on imports from Southern Rhodesia and South
Africa, such as clothing, shoes, agricultural equipment, some food items and matches.
Although Botswana has experienced a similar phenomenon, it has had much more
influence than Zambia over the development of its minerals sector. Surprisingly, mineral
prospecting in the territory began only eleven years before independence in 1955 (Debswana
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2009). De Beers Consolidated Mines, a company associated with Anglo American Corporation
of South Africa, was granted a concession from the British government to prospect for diamonds.
It was in April 1967, one year after independence, that the Orapa diamond pipe was discovered
about 240km west of Francistown in western Botswana (Debswana 2009). Two years later, in
1969, Debswana was incorporated. Despite its influence in the development of its mining
industry, the government of Botswana has had difficulty extending the industrialization process
to a strong domestic manufacturing sector. Like Zambia, Botswana remains dependent on
imports from South Africa to supply its domestic markets. Even more indicative of the enclave
nature of the Botswana diamond industry is the low-level of employment it creates. The
relatively low level of employment generated by its major export sector has proved difficult for
the government to overcome.

Hypothesis 4: Dutch Disease
Booming mineral sectors cause an appreciation in the real exchange rate resulting in a decline
in the manufacturing sector.

The fourth hypothesis in the economic category is the Dutch disease. Hausmann and Rigobon
(2002) summarize the Dutch disease as an effect on the domestic economy in which resource
booms generate higher revenues, currency appreciation and a higher demand for tradeable and
non-tradable goods. Non-tradable goods, by definition, must be produced domestically, while
tradable goods can simply be imported; thus, domestic resources are allocated to meet the
demand for non-tradable goods at the expense of the domestic manufacturing of tradable goods.
The result is a weakening of the manufacturing sector needed for development. This effect was
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first noticed in the Netherlands, hence the name of the ‘disease’, after the discovery of natural
gas caused a recession there (Leite and Weidmann 1999). Sachs and Warner have conducted
much of the research on this hypothesis. They state that “The core of the Dutch disease story is
that resource abundance in general or resource booms in particular shift resources away from
sectors of the economy that have positive externalities for growth” (Sachs and Warner 1999, 48).
Similarly, Pegg (2009, 15) describes the effects of the Dutch disease as “a sectoral reallocation
of economic resources. Capital and labor are drawn away from agriculture and manufacturing
and they flow into the extractive sector.” However, there is much debate over the effects of the
Dutch disease in developing countries such as Botswana and Zambia. Ross notes that “More
recent research suggests, however, that it is less common in developing states than originally
thought, and that governments can usually offset its impact, should they feel it necessary” (1999,
305).
The question of whether Zambia has been affected by the Dutch disease does not have a
clear answer. It is clear that the mining industry has remained the dominant source of exports and
government revenue throughout the country’s history since independence, compared to the
contributions of other sectors such as manufacturing. If the Dutch disease had afflicted Zambia,
then its effects would have been apparent in the period immediately after independence since
copper prices remained high until the early 1970s. However, the development of the
manufacturing sectors has not followed the strictly negative path predicted by Dutch disease
theory. On the contrary, the manufacturing sector actually grew during the immediate postindependence period, and has experienced periods of growth and stagnation since.
The Botswanan case is more complicated. It is clear that since the development of the
mining industry began in the mid-1960s, a sectoral shift has taken place from the agricultural
15

sector to mining. As Leith (1997, 24) notes, “Agriculture and mining effectively swapped places.
Agriculture shrank from 32% of GDP in 1974/75 to just over 4% in 1994/95; while mining
expanded from 8% to a peak of 53% in 1988/89.” Manufacturing has experienced a similar fate
with its percentage of GDP oscillating between 3% and 5%. Lending patterns also seem to
indicate the possibility of minor Dutch disease effects in Botswana. In 1980, “Mining companies
obtained easily the largest share of credit, namely 38 per cent…followed by agriculture, mostly
cattle ranching, with 21 per cent. In contrast, advances to manufacturing remained miniscule, at 5
per cent of the total” (Good 2008, 74). Botswana’s difficulties in diversification can also been
explained by other noted constraints on industrialization. Some commonly cited blocks facing
the industrial sector include “the smallness of the domestic market, poor quality of products, lack
of personnel with relevant managerial and technical skills, high wages in relation to productivity,
lack of access to long-term finance…and the high cost of utilities” (Mpabanga 1997, 372). Other
difficulties to be overcome by manufacturers hoping to export are Botswana’s land-locked
position, and its dependence on South Africa for needed imports of inputs, transportation for
exports or markets for exports. In this sense, South Africa has proven to be an impediment to
Botswana’s industrialization attempts.
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2.2 Political Hypotheses

Hypothesis 5: Mismanagement of Resource Rents
Certain policies utilizing resource rents cause low economic growth.

This hypothesis is better thought of as a category in itself, which is constituted by several other
more specific hypotheses. It is broadly concerned with the policies governments implement to
manage and use resource rents. Auty is a major contributor to the literature on government policy
and the appropriation of mineral rents. Auty and Mikesell (1998) argue that the rents generated
by mineral extraction make the most important contribution to a mineral-dependent country’s
economy. As Auty (2006, 136) argues, the nature of mineral dependence is that mineral rents
become the dominate stream of revenue for a mineral-exporter, and results in the domestic
economy becoming “acutely sensitive to the manner in which the government deploys the tax
revenue.” Similarly, Daniel (1992, 89) argues that “the fiscal linkage (the contribution to
government revenue and thus to public expenditure programs) from a mineral-export sector is
likely to be the most important positive linkage.”
Some of the specific hypotheses that make up this broader hypothesis are addressed by
Bomsel. Bomsel (1992) identifies three common patterns in the way that mineral-dependent
governments utilize their mineral rents. These patterns are:
•

the use of mining rents to avoid or postpone needed, but unpopular, structural
adjustments in agriculture or other important economic sectors;

•

the use of mining rents for economically unproductive welfare purposes; and
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•

the use of rents in ways that increase the dependence and vulnerability of the domestic
economy to external forces.
Similarly, the extent of a country’s state-owned enterprises may be important

determinants of the ability of a state to overcome the resource curse. Ross (1999, 320) argues this
point in regard to nationalized mining companies: state-owned mining companies “may have
also ‘softened’ the budget constraints of resource-exporting governments, producing fiscal laxity
and a tendency to overborrow.” Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) discuss the possible connection
between resource dependency and lack of openness to trade and import substitution policies.
Stevens (2003) notes two other manifestations of mismanagement. He notes first, like Papyrakis
and Gerlagh, that these governments implemented policies of import substitution, which became
unsustainable; and second that government investments of resource rents generally fail to
stimulate other sectors of the economy because they tend to invest in “non-tradables, especially
the military and in projects that offered very low rates of return.” Another explanation of misuse
of mineral revenues is offered by Gylfason (2002, 2), who states that “natural resource intensity
may under certain conditions blunt incentives to save and invest and thereby reduce economic
growth” (emphasis added). In all of these respects there is a significant difference between the
policies executed by the Zambian and Botswanan governments.
Many of the above observations regarding poor mineral revenue utilization and
management pertain to the Zambian case. In Zambia, the government began import-substitution
policies, agricultural subsidies, the nationalization of industries such as the mining industry, and
the expulsion of non-Zambians from the economy just after independence. These policies
resulted in the misappropriation of Zambia’s copper rents. Regarding import-substitution,
President Kenneth Kaunda following the development strategy recommended by a United
18

Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) report and “developed a basic strategy of development
based on the rapid establishment of import-substitutive manufacturing industries and the
transformation of African agriculture by the application of modern techniques” (Elliot 1975, 10).
These policies led to an increase of state-involvement in manufacturing under the state-owned
industrial conglomerate, the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), created in 1968. In
addition to INDECO, tariffs and import quotas were established to control the importation of
manufactured goods. With regard to agriculture, the state established the National Agricultural
Marketing Board in 1969, which subsidized seed and fertilizers for farmers and created a
monopoly in the purchase and marketing of Zambian produce.
In the first decade of the republic, the manufacturing sector experienced a relatively rapid
level of growth; however, the agricultural sector grew only slowly. There were three problems
with the implementation of these policies. The first was the effect on the development of the
manufacturing sector, which “was shifting its vulnerability from the stage of finished imports to
dependency on imported inputs and technology” (Burdette 1988, 92). Second, the agricultural
subsidies had no effect on increasing agricultural production, but merely served to provide cheap
maize to the urban populations, which would prove problematic for later attempts at reform.
Finally, the main problems emerged when the price of copper began to fall in the mid-1970s.
Foreign exchange provided by the copper industry supported import substitution, a policy that
ultimately became unviable as the price of copper fluctuated relative to government expenditure.
By contrast with Zambia, it is precisely in the area of rents management that Botswana is
heralded as a successful resource-dependent economy. The government greatly suppressed the
urge to spend; it created funds for saving and stockpiling resource rents and managed to amass
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large foreign exchange reserves. In 1996 the government held enough foreign exchange to cover
38 months of imports (Jefferis 1997). The BDP decided to retain expatriate bureaucrats and
technocrats in order to use their expertise to implement Botswana’s development policy and to
negotiate with foreign agents such as the South African government, the European Economic
Community, and multi-national mining corporations such as De Beers. The government used
bureaucratic expertise to establish its successful state-led development strategy, which focused
on creating incentives for the private sector, with a stable exchange rate, relatively low taxes, and
liberal foreign exchange flows. Following independence, investments were made in physical
infrastructure as well as human capital with improvements to the educational and health systems.
Finally, the government created organizations designed to develop and diversify the economy
into manufacturing, although the attempt to do so through government parastatals has not met
with as much success as the other policies mentioned. Overall, as illustrated in greater depth in
section 4, Botswana’s success can be explained in part by its ability to avoid the mismanagement
of resource rents that the resource curse theory presents as a major problem for resourcedependent nations.

Hypothesis 6: Weak institutions
Resource rents cause the development of parasitic state institutions which result in low economic
growth.

This hypothesis regarding the effects of weak institutions is a broad and complicated one,
including sub-hypotheses regarding rent-seeking, corruption and the tendency towards
authoritarianism. Political economy is at the core of these explanations and the central question
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is: what are the relations between natural resource wealth and political institutions? Terry Karl
has made significant contributions in this area, particularly with regard to her analysis of petrostates. She argues that there is a deeper force at work in resource-dependent states than just the
mismanagement of rents. This deeper force is the tendency for the creation of rentier-states and
their associated parasitic institutions. These institutions are described by Karl (1999, 34) as
“overly-centralized political power, strong networks of complicity between public and private
sector actors, highly uneven mineral-based development subsidized by oil rents and the
replacement of domestic tax revenues and other sources of earned income by petrodollars.”
Rentier-states are alternatively defined by Isham, et al. (2002, 7) as states whose budgets are
“based on revenues from the export of fuels and minerals” that “allow governments to mollify
dissent…avoid accountability pressures…and repress opposition movements, independent
business groups, and civil society organizations.”
Many have used indicators such as the extent of government employment as a means to
buy-off interest groups, property rights and contract enforcement, strength of the bureaucracy,
strength of the judiciary, and development of the tax regime to assess the institutions of rentierstates. Rodrik (2000, 4) discusses the connection between institutions and the judiciary, stating
that “We must, in other words, have a system of laws and courts to make even ‘perfect’ markets
function,” in order to protect property rights and to enforce contracts. Robinson, Torvik and
Verdier (2006) discuss employment in the public sector as a form of patronage. With regard to
the importance of property rights protection and their connection with good institutions and
economic growth, Boschini (2005, 4) states, “Mining…requires large investments and therefore
good property rights protection is essential for such investments to be undertaken.” Isham et al.
(2002, 13) discuss the connection between a well-developed tax regime and good institutions:
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“The lack of a necessity to actively extract taxation led to…no ability to mobilize taxes, and thus
neither capacity nor legitimacy.”
Many of the above institutional characteristics can be found in Zambia. At independence
in 1964, Kenneth Kaunda of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was elected the
country’s first president. The constitution established at independence created a semi-presidential
system in which a strong executive in the form of the president coexisted with a Westminsterstyle parliament. Problems with this distribution of power emerged when discontent began to
surface in the five years after independence. President Kaunda gradually began to accrue power
to the presidency in order to maintain the stability of the government. As a result of continuous
threats to the power of the UNIP and the broader security of the government, President Kaunda
created a one-party state in 1972. This change marked the beginning of the Second Republic, and
the increasingly centralized nature of Zambian state. The centralization of power in the executive
fed the development of other weak institutions in Zambia, such as the endemic weakness of its
bureaucracy due to corruption and its use as a means of buying political support. In this way, the
political institutions of the Zambian state resemble those of neo-patrimonial states.
In addition to Botswana’s well-managed resource rents, its relatively strong institutional
quality is often cited as a unique feature that sets Botswana apart from many other resourcedependent developing countries. As Iimi argues, the reason for Botswana’s escape from the
resource curse is mostly because of “good institutions and governance.” His indicators are:
“voice and accountability, government effectiveness, the quality of regulation and anticorruption
policies” (2006, 15). Botswana has maintained a functioning electoral democracy since
independence. Like Zambia, the system is based on a combination of a Westminster
parliamentary system and a presidential system, in which the executive branch is afforded an
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excess of power to which successive presidents have managed to add. The strength of the
executive has in large part been due to the continuance in power of the Botswana Democratic
Party (BDP) since independence. Despite the preponderance of executive power in Botswana,
the bureaucracy has developed the ability to formulate and implement effective economic policy.
These policies in many cases, especially minerals policy, reflect a public-private partnership
between ministers and multinational mining companies.

Hypothesis 7: Rent-Seeking and Corruption
7.1 Resource rents cause rent-seeking which results in low economic growth.

Rent-seeking is a prominent explanation for poor economic performance found in the resource
curse literature. Rent-seeking is defined by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993, 409) as “any
redistributive activity that takes up resources.” More specifically, rent-seeking is the redirection
of resources into expenditures that create “no social value and, arguably more importantly,
distort markets and hence the way the economy operates” (Stevens 2003, 14). Rent-seeking is
often associated with the power of political interest groups, as opposed to individual cases of
private or bureaucratic corruption. “In an economy with multiple powerful groups that each has
open access to production, higher productivity may in fact push the rate of return on investment
and thus, growth, down,” for when “productivity increases, each group attempts to acquire a
greater share of production by demanding more transfers” (Torvik 2002, 456). Another
explanation concerning the effects of rent-seeking argues that it creates an environment that
removes entrepreneurial incentives and innovative behavior. As Hausmann and Rigobon (2002,
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6) state, “There is so much wealth floating around the government that entrepreneurial persons
find it much more profitable to engage in unproductive rent-seeking activities to appropriate that
wealth rather than in creating more wealth.”

7.2 Resource rents cause corruption which results in low economic growth.

With regard to corruption, it has been argued that governments often mismanage mineral rents
due to corruption. As Ross (2001) argues, political elites use the opportunity to embezzle rents in
order to accumulate personal wealth, or as he calls it—“rent seizing.” If politicians are not
embezzling rents themselves, they could be accepting bribes to allow access to the system by
outside actors. As Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004, 188) state, natural resource “rents induce
economic agents to bribe the administration in order to gain access.”
Zambia has fallen prey to both rent-seeking and corruption. Prominent interest groups,
such as the urban mine workers, emerging entrepreneurs, and the civil servant governing class
have all been able to exert influence over the governing structures of the state to secure shares of
state windfall revenues from the mining industry. Shares of the rent for the mine workers and
other unionized urban workers came in the form of continuous negotiations of wage increases.
For the civil servants, the power of office-holding came with the power to distribute contracts,
loans, licenses etc and thus, the opportunity for personal gain (Makoba 1998). “Sections of the
petite bourgeoisie and aspirant bourgeoisie connected to the state and the party directed their
energies to the grab for personal wealth” (Burdette 1988, 115). The presence of corruption in
Zambia is noted by the citizens themselves. In a study conducted by James Ferguson (1999) in
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Kite, Zambia from 1985-1986 and in 1989, he found that Zambians were increasingly blaming
“the selfish Zambian” and corruption for the economic decline of the country.
In contrast to the Zambian experience, Botswana has not suffered from rent-seeking. As a
result of it social structure at independence, organized civil society in Botswana is virtually nonexistent. The only powerful group at independence was the tribal elite, which had remained
intact under colonial administration. It was this group of cattle barons which inherited the state
upon independence, and it is this group that has remained in power relatively uncontested.
Botswana, has, however experienced some cases of corruption and misuse of public office for
personal benefit. These cases became known to the public in the mid-1990s. The most wellknown were the misuse of public authority at the Botswana Housing Corporation, and the misuse
of public loan funds by high-ranking Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) officials at the National
Development Bank. Combined, the corruption discovered at these two parastatals cost the
country between pula 50 and P150 million. While this amount is low compared to government
revenue, these instances cast a shadow over Botswana’s success in resource appropriation as well
as the strength of Botswana’s institutions.

Hypothesis 8: Regime Type
Resource rents results in authoritarian regimes which cause low economic growth.

This hypothesis is closely related to the latter hypothesis regarding institutions, and if not for its
distinct presence in the literature it could be included within that category. However, many note
the correlation between resource-dependent states and authoritarian regimes. Damania and Bulte
(2003, 31) argue that “In the absence of political competition, governments are more receptive to
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special interest lobbying,” and as a result they “stray away from the welfare maximising path and
provide excessive support to the resource sector.”
This explanation does not hold for either Zambia or Botswana. Both have been
considered democracies since independence, and have experienced relatively similar
development paths in this respect. Both have held regular elections since independence and were
one-party democracies (de facto in Botswana and de jure in Zambia) for much of their histories.
It was in Zambia that the multi-party system collapsed, as mentioned above, in 1972. However,
the reason for the collapse of multi-party democracy was not because of a lack of political
opposition to the UNIP, but because of the increasingly divisive nature of politics in the nation
along regional and class cleavage lines. Building up to the declaration of the one-party state, the
main opposition party at the time was led by Simon Kapwepwe of the United Progressive Party.
In this light, it is difficult to argue that Zambia’s rent-mismanagement was the consequence of an
unaccountable authoritarian regime.
In Botswana, however, the BDP founded by the country’s first president Seretse Khama
has retained power from independence, without the institution of a constitutional one-party state
and despite the increasing challenges it receives from strengthening second and third-party
rivals. Although the BDP did not use its power to reshape the rules of political competition in
order to control it, the BDP did use its power over state-led media organizations to control and
repress political opposition and criticism. Similarly, the Presidency used its powers to the fullest
in maintaining control of the government. The Presidency is by far the most powerful office in
Botswana. The President is not directly elected by the people, and since 1997 has been allowed
to appoint his Vice President as his successor. The President can appoint specially selected
members of the National Assembly, even if these members have been rejected in elections, and
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control the policy agenda and make decisions, such as use of the military, without Parliamentary
debate. The Botswana is technically an electoral democracy; however, it shares the
characteristics of many authoritarian states. Regardless of these authoritarian tendencies
Botswana has not experienced poor economic growth as predicted by this hypothesis, and in
contrast there is evidence that the strong BDP and executive has led to better economic decision
making.

Hypothesis 9: Social Conflict
Resource rents cause social conflict which results in low economic growth.

Social conflict “is harmful both because it diverts resources form economically productive
activities and because it discourages such activities by the uncertainty it generates” (Rodrik
2001, 12). In many states dependent on natural resource wealth, civil wars and social conflict
have been a source of frequent disruption, as indicated by the experiences of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola. Collier and Hoeffler (2005, 628) argue that
primary commodity dependence results in areas of localized sources of rents and proneness to
economic shock, which generate social conflict: “rents and shocks create multiple routes by
which primary commodity dependence may be linked to the risk of conflict.” Neither Botswana
nor Zambia are significant examples of social conflict or civil war. Neither country has
experienced civil war, but both have withstood the encroachment of military conflicts in
neighboring states, most notably that of Southern Rhodesia beginning with its Universal
Declaration of Independence in 1965.
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While managing not to slide into war with white-settler dominated Southern Rhodesia or
South Africa, Zambia has experience periods of social conflict that are of greater significance
than in Botswana. As mentioned above in reference to the effects of authoritarianism on
resource rent-management, political leadership under Kaunda resorted to the detainment and
torture of political opposition leaders. This history of oppression of political opposition began
before the UPP detentions in 1971 with the banning of the United Party that was formed by the
Lozi of the Western Province. “UP managed to mobilize support on the Copperbelt in the 1968
election campaign that led to violent clashes between UNIP and UP supporters” (Rakner 2003,
51-52). Similar violent clashes occurred again in 1971 between UPP supporters and UNIP on the
Copperbelt. The oppressed opposition of the UPP after the one-party state declaration in 1972
began to organize secretly, resulting in the arrest of “a small group of Zambian professionals and
Congolese dissidents” in 1980 who were charged with treason for the alleged planning of a
bloodless coup d’état (Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008, 7).
Botswana also bordered Southern Rhodesia and faced similar but more muted tensions
with the white-settler dominated regime; however, in addition to Rhodesia, Botswana bordered
another such regime, South Africa. Despite bordering these militaristic regimes and enduring
raids by the militias of these countries, the BDP managed to avoid conflict with both. It was
similarly successful on its domestic front. There have been no attempted military overthrows of
the Botswana government or even strong opposition to the rule of the BDP. More recently in the
mid-1990s, there have been riots and marches that have taken place due to the anger of youth
over the lack of state protection and unemployment. One explanation for the comparative social
calm and cohesion in Botswana is the social structure established by the Tswana tribes who have
dominated the area since before colonization. Botswana is a country with a strong tribal system
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dominated by eight related Tswana tribes. This domination has reduced tribal and regional
tensions that exist in many other sub-Saharan African countries and can be destructive to
government and particularly to economic policy.

2.3 Conclusions

This section has assessed the principal hypotheses advanced to explain the resource curse
phenomenon. The pertinence of each of these hypotheses for the cases of Zambia and Botswana
has been outlined and initial comparisons have been made between the cases. These comparisons
lead to the following conclusions. Neither Zambia nor Botswana has experienced declining terms
of trade due to their respective mineral exports. Zambia has experienced a decline in economic
growth as a consequence of copper price instability, whereas Botswana has benefited from stable
diamond prices. Both countries have mining industries that are not highly integrated into the
surrounding domestic economy. There is no evidence to support the Dutch disease hypothesis in
Zambia, whereas it is likely that Dutch disease effects have occurred in Botswana. Zambia has
implemented poor economic policies, especially policies for managing resource rents, whereas
Botswana has been more successful in both respects. Zambia has weak political institutions
compared to Botswana’s strong political institutions, and Zambia has rent-seeking and corruption
problems while Botswana has only recently had problems with corruption. Both countries have
had similar one-party dominance and the development of strong executives. Finally, social
conflict has been more prominent in Zambia than in Botswana where social cohesion is high.
The differences noted between the cases for hypotheses two, five, six, seven, and nine seem to
account for the difference in economic success of these countries. These initial conclusions
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regarding the presence, presence without predicted result, or absence of each hypothesis for the
two cases, are represented in the following table. The purpose of sections 3 and 4 is to examine
the interaction effects of these different factors and to provide a more robust set of explanations
for the different economic outcomes found in these two resource-dependent states.
Table 2.1: Resource Curse Hypotheses and Their Degree of Presence in Botswana
and Zambia
Botswana
H1: Declining Terms of
Trade
H2: Price Volatility
H3: Weak Linkages
H4: Dutch Disease
H5: Rent Mismanagement
H6: Weak Institutions
H7: Rent-seeking and
Corruption
H8: Authoritarianism
H9: Social Conflict

Zambia

0

0

0.5
0.5
0.5
0
0
0.5

1
1
0
1
1
1

0.5
0

0.5
0.5

0-no presence; 0.5-presence without predicted result; 1-presence of predicted resource curse effects
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3: The Case of Zambia

The copper mining industry was from the beginning the foundation of the Zambian economy.
The industry was established during colonial rule by the British South Africa Company in the
1920s. With this level of dependence on its mineral resources and its troubled economic
development, Zambia is an exemplary case for analyzing the hypotheses of the resource curse.
This section is divided into two parts. The first discusses the evidence for each of the economic
hypotheses and their degree of presence within the case. The second discusses the evidence for
each political hypothesis.
The economic history of Zambia reveals the presence of two of the four economic
hypotheses: (1) that the mining industry does not lead to the growth of other economic sectors,
and (2) that the volatility of primary product prices makes it difficult for governments to manage
resource rents. The Dutch disease hypothesis is not vigorously support or denied by the case of
Zambia; but the argument put forward by Prebisch concerning declining terms of trade is clearly
not supported. In contrast to these economic hypotheses, all of the political causal mechanisms
proposed by the resource curse hypotheses are present in the Zambian case to various degrees.
Initially, the government used resource rents to carry out successful infrastructural
projects that help explain the relative economic growth of the first decade after independence.
Following this initial success, Zambia has suffered from poorly-managed resource rents due to a
number of policy failures: dysfunctional import-substitution policies, destructive mineral
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taxation policies, nationalization, Zambianization and mismanagement of the mining industry
and of its subsequent privatization. Institutionally, the country has low institutional capacity due
to a lack of bureaucratic expertise and neo-patrimonial relationships between bureaucrats and the
public that have resulted in a misallocation of state resources. Rent seeking and corruption have
also adversely affected Zambian institutional quality and undermined economic efficiency. There
have been instances of authoritarianism in Zambia. Social conflict has occurred in Zambia to a
limited extent and has been mostly between the government and labor unions.

3.1 Economic explanations

The argument that mineral producers will experience long-term negative terms of trade is not
supported by the Zambian data. It is clear that mineral prices tend to fluctuate rather than
experience an overall declining trend and the international price of copper is no exception.
Zambia sells its copper at the price set by the London Metal Exchange, which experiences
fluctuations depending on a variety of factors, such as speculative activity and supply and
demand. The defining event in Zambia’s economic history was the collapse in copper export
earnings and the government’s response to this collapse (Rakner 2003). In 1972, two years after
nationalization agreements with Anglo American and RST had been signed, a prolonged slump
in the LME price of copper marked the beginning of trouble for the Zambian economy. The
fluctuation in copper price can be seen in the following table.
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Table 3.1: Copper Prices Since 1964

US$ per metric ton
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The drop in copper prices, along with other issues faced by the newly nationalized
industry, such as an overall fall in production, led to a decline in GDP (see table 3.2) and an
increase in foreign borrowing. As noted by Auty (1991, 175), “foreign borrowing provided the
principal adjustment mechanism to external shock.” One aspect of this borrowing was Zambia’s
increasingly troubled relationship with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The relationship with the IMF began in 1973. As can be seen in table 3.3, by 1977, the
government had completely exhausted its foreign reserves. The World Bank entered the picture
one year later in 1978 when Zambia had become poor enough to qualify for International
Development Association funds. The Bank pledged US $50 million per annum for the next five
years. The economic decline of the 1970s was rationalized by the government as being due to
external factors such as the war with Rhodesia and the fall in copper prices and as a result it
thought the recession would only be temporary.
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Table 3.2: Gross Domestic Product from 1964-1985 (ZMK Bns)
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Table 3.3: Foreign Exchange From 1964-2001 (US$ millions)
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The third economic hypothesis presented in section 2, which states that mineral resource
economies are constrained by the enclave nature of the mining industry, is also supported by the
experience of Zambia. The concern of the British South African Company, which had colonized
the territory, with the territory’s resource wealth led to the establishment of a dynamic mining
industry that drew more Europeans to the territory but was quite unconnected to the lives of the
majority of Africans living in Zambia who were to inherit it. Expatriate mine workers and
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managers immigrated to shape the mining industry. In 1920 there were 3,000 Europeans in
Northern Rhodesia, which grew to 36,000 by 1950 (Sklar 1975). As a result of the growth of the
copper mining industry under colonialism, the “dual nature” of the Zambian economy was
established. “Zambia contained a technologically modern mining enclave with certain
appendages, mainly along the line-of-rail, in the midst of a rural and traditional subsistence
economy,” that has resulted in “social and economic ‘dualism’” (Sklar 1975, 25).
It is clear that the price of copper has been integral to the success or failure of the
Zambian economy; however, the hypothesis that a booming minerals sector results in a decline
of the manufacturing sector as a result of the Dutch disease mechanism is not clearly supported.
As was mentioned above, the Zambian manufacturing sector has not experienced a dramatic
decline during resource booms. In the decade after independence, manufacturing “showed a
compound annual growth rate of 7.4 percent between 1965 and 1976. In 1965, the sector
contributed just under 7 percent of GDP, and in 1976 its contribution was 11 percent”
(Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981, 64). A similar test for the presence of the Dutch disease in
Zambia has been conducted by examining the change in the value added by the manufacturing
sector as a proportion of GDP. This indicator has steadily risen from just above 5 percent in 1965
to its highest of around 35 percent in 1992 (du Plessis and du Plessis 2006).

3.2 Political Explanations

The first political hypothesis of the resource curse literature concerns policies that affect the
management of resource rents. The first policies implemented by the Zambian government that
used resource rents were established in its First National Development Plan (FNDP) (196635

1971). The FNDP was a four-year plan that “mixed capitalist incentives and expectations with
state direction to diversify the industrial economy, giving priority to construction of physical and
social infrastructure” (Burdette 1988, 85). It was this policy of building infrastructure, along with
the stable price of copper that was behind the first post-colonial decade of economic growth in
Zambia. Projects of physical infrastructure development included building roadways, railways,
energy infrastructure, and factories, whereas social infrastructure projects began with the
implementation of agricultural reform, education and health.
All of these projects met with a modicum of success, with the ultimate exception of
agriculture. The physical infrastructure projects became of great importance when white-settler
dominated Southern Rhodesia declared independence from Great Britain in 1965. The Universal
Declaration of Independence resulted in sanctions from the Security Council of the United
Nations (i.e. oil embargos). This prompted both economic and political difficulties for Zambia.
Economically, much of its exports and imports, especially oil, were kept from leaving Rhodesia
(Sklar 1975). Politically, this marked the intensification of Zambia’s ‘Frontline’ position against
the domination of white-settler regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and required the
Zambian government to find alternate sources of energy, manufactured goods, and export routes.
Regarding transportation infrastructure projects, the Zambian government built the Great North
Road to Tanzania (822 km), the Great East Road to Malawi (430 km), and Lusaka International
Airport (Burdette 1988). It had similar success in energy infrastructure; hydroelectric power
stations were constructed, such as the Victoria Falls generating station, along with an oil
pipeline, and a petrol refinery.
Manufacturing also experienced some growth in the early post-independence period due
to policy success. The sector’s contribution to GDP had grown from 6.1 percent in 1964 to 11
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percent in 1971. One part of the FNDP was to use import-substitution to support a diversification
of the economy away from copper and into manufacturing: “To accelerate the pace of
industrialization, the Zambian government initiated industrial projects in cooperation with
foreign capital,” by providing “tax breaks, tariff protection, and guaranteed repatriation of
profits” as incentives for private business (Makoba 1998, 122). But the initial expansion of the
manufacturing sector, supported by import-substitution policy, did not continue or make a major
contribution to the nation’s economy.
There were three main problems with the government’s import-substitution strategy. The
first was that a high level of investment by foreign capital into the development projects of the
Zambian government did not materialize as had been anticipated. As a result, the government
provided 95 percent of total development financing during FNDP compared with 5 percent from
the private sector. A consequence of this lack of foreign financing was that the government
began shifting the revenue it derived from copper industry rents into these projects. The second
problem was the reliance of the manufacturing sector on foreign manufactured inputs. The
Zambian manufacturing sector shifted “its vulnerability from the stage of finished imports to
dependency on imported inputs and technology” (Burdette 1988, 92). Large scale, capital
intensive enterprises, such as Livingstone Motor Assemblers, Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia,
Kafue Textiles and Nakambala Sugar Estates and Refinery, are examples of this dependence on
imports of parts and materials (Makoba 1998, 122). Dependence on foreign manufactured inputs
made manufacturing dependent, in turn, on the government’s ability to purchase these inputs,
which consumed vital resource rents. The third problem was that these industries manufactured
products for an elite domestic population rather than for the larger population or for export. The
Zambian manufacturing sector was not structured in such a way as to grow into an export-led
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sector and the export of manufactured goods has been insignificant (Obidegwu and
Nziramasanga 1981, 64). These three missteps with import-substitution policy illustrate the
difficulties the Zambian government experienced in managing its resource rents.
In addition to its failed import-substitution policy, the government badly mismanaged its
minerals taxation policy. In 1968, President Kaunda gave a series of speeches in which he
announced that significant changes were to be made to the organization of Zambia’s economy,
which have since become known as the Mulungushi reforms. The first reform announced
included a change in the system of taxes imposed on multi-national mining companies. Reforms
to Zambia’s mineral’s policy were of particular interest to MNCs considering the somewhat
tense relationship between the government and the mining companies since independence. There
was deep distrust of MNCs within the Kaunda government. The mining multinationals were
concerned with the future prosperity of their investments and hoped for a change in the preindependence tax system, which did nothing to diminish the suspicions of the Kaunda
government, which suspected that the MNCs were seeking to evade taxes. Kaunda made his
sentiments regarding the MNCs known in his speech at Mulungushi when he stated, “The
companies claim that the royalty system has been against new development…I do not agree”
(quoted in O’Faircheallaigh 1984, 104).
Despite his suspicions of the MNCs, Kaunda had the tax system, which was complex and
antiquated, changed. This unnecessarily complex system of taxation was leftover from
colonialism in which royalty payments were paid by the companies to the British South Africa
Company, which owned the mining rights (Harvey 1975). These payments had simply been
transferred to the government after independence. The changes to the system eliminated both the
royalty payments and export taxes about which the mining companies had complained. Those
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complaints centered on the argument that as taxes on production these taxes neglected to include
costs in the equation, thus rendering unprofitable many lesser productive mines, or lower grade
orebodies because of the cost of extraction. The royalty and export tax were eliminated, but the
profits, or income tax, was retained and accompanied by a new minerals tax. At the end of the
day, and after two years of debate, the mining companies were to pay a flat 73.05 percent tax on
profits, which was just 1.37% less than the total tax they paid before the reforms
(O’Faircheallaigh 1984). This mini-war between the multi-nationals and the government, as well
as the uncertainty created over taxation, was no help to the government in securing its stream of
resource rents.
Two other important government policy reforms outlined in the Mulungushi Reforms—
nationalization and ‘Zambianization’—were to be financially very costly. Nationalization was
deemed necessary to “assert public control over all major aspects of the Zambian economy”
(Mhone 1982, 37). This goal was to be achieved by Kaunda’s request for twenty-seven private
companies, which were engaged in a variety of economic activities, such as building material
and construction, road transportation, retail and wholesale, and breweries, to ‘invite’ the
government to purchase 51 percent equity stakes (Makoba 1998). The negotiation of these sales
was handled by the newly-established Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). These
nationalizations formed a sizeable parastatal industrial complex with net assets worth Kwacha
167.9 million by March 31, 1972 (Burdette 1988). The policy of nationalization continued into
the 1990s. According to Bennell (1997), there were 170 state-owned enterprises operated by the
Zambian government by 1991.
The second goal of the Mulungushi reforms was Zambianization. The objective of this
policy was to increase the number of Zambians actively involved in the economy.
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Zambianization was especially important to the Kaunda government given the country’s heavy
dependence on expatriate entrepreneurs and managers. Several policies were implemented in
order to achieve Zambianization. These policies included: the issuance of business licenses to
Zambians only with a few geographical exceptions, the reservation of government contracts less
than 100,000 kwacha for Zambians, and compelling foreigners who owned businesses in Zambia
in designated areas to sell or become citizens (Makoba 1998).
A crucially important example of these two policies that illustrates their damaging effects
was the nationalization and Zambianization of the mining industry. As with other companies,
the President suggested that the mining companies “invite” the government to buy 51% equity
shares (O’Faircheallaigh 1984). As a result, two new joint ventures between the Zambian
government and the mining companies were formed—Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines
(NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Copper Mines (RCM). This move was viewed by Anglo and
RST as a surprise takeover by the government. As part of the agreements reached during the
1969 negotiations, Anglo American and RST would, however, continue to provide management
services to the copper industry through management contracts. The government paid for their
shares via bonds issued to Anglo American and RST, which were immediately redeemable if the
contract was nullified.
The nationalization of the mining industry had significant consequences for Zambia’s
major revenue earner and ultimately led to the ruination of the industry for decades, as will be
discussed below. Part of the problem with the mining industry’s nationalization was the
government’s inability to negotiate with Anglo American and RST. The government negotiators
lacked clearly delineated priorities. This “failure to establish priorities meant that they were
pursuing a wide variety of aims, not all of them mutually consistent and relating, for example, to
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revenue generation investment policies and production rates, corporate decision-making, and the
extent and character of compensation” (O’Faircheallaigh 1984, 119). Its poorly defined
objectives left the government unsatisfied with its subsequent joint-ventures, which led to
another poor decision by the Kaunda government in 1973.
As a result of the government’s dissatisfaction with the degree of influence gained over
the MNCs with nationalization in 1969, it decided in 1973 to cancel the management contracts
with Anglo American and RST and increase state control over the mines. Kaunda believed the
only way to economic independence was through control of the copper industry. As he stated in
his speech to the UNIP National Council in August 1969, “I wanted the mining economic
reforms to set the Nation well and truly towards its economic independence,” and “I do not think
that this can be achieved without the Nation acquiring full control of the existing mines” (quoted
in O’Faircheallaigh 1984, 107). In addition to economic independence, the other policy goal of
the nullification of the management contracts was to ensure that the policy of Zambianization
was extended to the minerals sector. In a speech in August 1973, President Kaunda expressed his
discontent with the 1969 agreement because it had no provision for Zambianization of the mines
(Makoba 1998).
This decision had four negative consequences. The first was the monetary consequence
of breaching the contracts. Upon nullifying the management contracts, the government was
responsible for immediately redeeming its bonds to Anglo American and RST in the amount of
$226.3 million and an additional $85 million in penalty fees negotiated with the MNCs (Burdette
1988). Meeting this obligation depleted the country’s foreign currency reserves. The second was
that the industry saw an exodus of expatriate workers, which meant an exodus of industry
expertise. In the period from 1973 to 1978, expatriate employment in management and higher
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levels fell 30%. It is likely that this exodus affected the efficiency and the soon to be endemic
lower production levels of the mines. The third negative consequence, and possibly the most
significant, was that with the increased role of government in the mines, “investment in the
industry [was] now linked to the economic condition of Zambia as well as to world copper
market conditions” (Obidegwu and Nziramasanga 1981, 18 emphasis added). The fourth
negative consequence, which is tied to the Zambianization policy, is that with the nationalization
of the industry the government began to use the minerals sector as a major employer.
After 1973, Zambian involvement in the copper industry continued to climb with
continued harm being done to the nation’s fiscal situation. In 1979, the government gained a
61% equity share by turning government loans granted to the companies into equity when “the
private foreign equity holders…declined to contribute additional capital to keep their equity
share unchanged” (Radetzki 1985, 113). The last major change the government made to the
industry came in 1982 when the government consolidated the two companies, NCCM and RCM,
into Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). The aim of this consolidation was to
streamline the industry and to reduce duplication (Burdette 1988). After this consolidation the
copper industry would not be dealt with again until privatization talks began.
The policy of privatization also negatively affected Zambia’s financial situation. The
privatization policy was implemented by President Chiluba in the 1990s after the fall of the
Second Republic and its One-Party State. President Chiluba embarked on a long process of
liberal reform policies that were proposed by the IMF, including the privatization of the mining
sector. It took four years between the government’s first announcement of its intention to pursue
privatization with the Privatization Act of 1992 and its announcement of intent to sell the copper
mines in 1996. The process unfolded inconsistently, much like Zambia’s previous encounters
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with MNCs regarding mineral taxation and nationalization. The process began with international
bids that attracted the submissions of 26 companies by the end of bidding in February 1997
(Rakner 2003). Despite the close of the bidding process, the Chiluba administration decided to
remove ZCCM from the bidding, only to retract its retraction in March 1998 and enter into
negotiations with Kafue Consortium. Again, however, the government got cold feet and pulled
out of negotiations only to resume them again shortly thereafter; however, after failing to reach
agreement, Kafue rescinded its offer. The half-hearted commitment to privatizing ZCCM
ultimately “extended ZCCM’s loss-making record by another two years. ZCCM loses by 1999
were estimated at some US $ 200-300 million, the equivalent of 6-9 percent GDP” (Rakner
2003, 78). Finally, in 1999, the government followed-through on a significantly less
advantageous offer from Anglo American, and the transfer was made final in March of 2000,
eight years after the initiation of the government’s privatization policy.
The Kaunda government’s policies of import-substitution, minerals taxation,
nationalization, Zambianization, and Chiluba’s mismanagement of the ultimate privatization of
the copper industry, are prime examples of the fifth resource curse hypothesis—mismanagement
of resource rents. The import-substitution policies did result in marginal growth of the
manufacturing sector; however, this growth did not strengthen the sector as had been hoped. The
end product of the nationalization policy, which was the creation of a sizeable parastatal complex
that included Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, was a ‘staple trap’, in which revenue was
transferred from the primary sector to subsidize the expansion of inefficient manufacturing and
bureaucracy, which “increases reliance on the primary sector and depresses the economy-wide
efficiency of capital investment” (Auty 2006, 138-139). Essentially, the state-ownership of
ZCCM worsened the dependency of the state on the copper industry, reduced the industry’s
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ability to attract new sources of investment and hampered its ability to reform. Regarding
Zambianization, “One reasonable interpretation, is that management has discouraged the
introduction of labor-saving innovations and the government will not accept closures of
installations” that would reduce “large-scale labor redundancies” (Radetzki 1985, 114). A result
of this policy was that the government increasingly sought to use ZCCM as a major employer to
the political satisfaction of one of the governing party’s major supporters—the mining unions.
Lastly, the privatization policy left a loss-making parastatal (ZCCM) in place to continue as a
drain on economic resources.
The second political hypothesis advanced by the resource curse is that resourcedependent states develop poor or parasitic institutions. The overall quality of the Zambian
bureaucracy is an important indicator of the weakness of its political institutions. As just
mentioned, once the government nationalized the majority of the economy it began using its
parastatals as means of creating employment, indicating the neo-patrimonial nature of the
Zambian public sector. The Zambian public sector has also had problems with efficient policy
implementation, as illustrated by failings of the agencies created to implement agricultural
reforms. Reform of the agricultural sector was a main objective of the First National
Development Plan immediately following independence, which planned to create farming
cooperatives and increase the availability of credit for African farmers. The Department of
Cooperatives was responsible for establishing the farming cooperatives, while the Credit
Organization of Zambia (COZ) was responsible for issuing credit to support the cooperatives.
However, serious bureaucratic inefficiency resulted in the poor implementation of these
programs. The inefficiency of the Department of Cooperatives and COZ was due in part to the
lack of expertise of the bureaucrats and the political nature of credit distribution. Luapula,
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Northern and Eastern Provinces traditionally supported the UNIP and as a result were awarded
the vast majority of the rural credits (Makoba 1998). These problems compounded the other
difficulties the Zambian government faced in significantly restructuring the dual nature of the
economy and reducing its dependence on copper revenues.
The third political hypothesis is that resource dependency leads to rent-seeking and
corruption. Regarding rent-seeking, the Kaunda government had political reasons for increasing
its control over the mining industry. It needed the revenues of the industry to provide public
services as well as to satisfy the interests of various groups, such as the unions, the civil service,
the business community and ethno-regional groups. It was mainly urban groups, such as the
unions, civil servants and businesses who benefited from “the culture of subsidies, ranging from
food to housing, which the large mineral incomes had helped to sustain” (Bigsten and Mugerwa
2000, 5). The state ownership of the copper industry left no insulation between the state and rentseeking interests, such as the mine workers unions. The struggle between the government and the
mine workers unions over the distribution of resource rents and economic policy reforms after
independence revealed the dependence of political power on the support of powerful interest
groups, which led to the formation of a clientelistic, or patronage state system.
The mining unions in Zambia were formed during the colonial administration of the
country and as a strong force in the independence movement, and they were also the strongest
interest group in the newly independent nation. Not long after independence the relationship
between the mine workers’ unions and the UNIP government became increasingly combative.
The major strike-causing dispute was over wage bargaining. Despite its initial nationalization of
the mines in 1969, relations between the state and the mine unions did not improve. Instead, the
state had now taken the position of the mining companies, and “as far as labor was concerned,
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the owners were now the state and were to be treated accordingly” (Burdette 1988, 93). As a
result of these disagreements with labor, the government attempted to co-opt the power of the
unions by such measures as, “compulsory affiliation of all unions with a supervisory central
labor organization, restrictions on the right to strike…and the introduction of ‘works councils’
designed to improve industrial discipline” (Sklar 1975, 206). These strategies were introduced by
the Industrial Relations Act in 1971 which transformed the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), initially established in 1965 as a voluntary association, into the central union congress.
The consequences of this act were the opposite of its intentions. In essence the ZCTU became a
coordinating organization and “from the mid-1970s onwards, ZCTU became the main opposition
force in Zambia” (Rakner 2000, 7).
When revenues from the copper industry evaporated and could no longer support the
government’s public expenditures on food, housing and wage subsidies, the main issue of
contention between labor and the UNIP became economic policy reform. Before the fall in the
price of copper, the UNIP government could afford high wages and consumer goods subsidies;
however, after the copper price fell, from the mid-1970s Zambia, began to suffer from fiscal
deficits, and began borrowing abroad to meet its budget expenses. In the 1980s, Zambia went to
the IMF to seek assistance, and the government and the IMF introduced policy reform measures
in 1983. Zambian officials also went to the World Bank, which established its first structural
adjustment program (SAP) for the country. These measures were aimed at restoring fiscal
balance. These IFI measures had little time to take effect because Zambia subsequently walked
out of stand-by negotiations with the IFIs due to political pressure from groups such as the
unions. This was to become a signature of the government’s relationship with the IFIs—the
release and the subsequent cessation of funds. The Kaunda government again attempted to
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institute economic reforms in 1985. These adjustments included the “decontrol of the central
bank interests rates, the creation of a foreign exchange auction,” and previous, unimplemented
reforms which included “the reduction of government subsidies by eliminating price
controls…reduced budgetary deficits, reduced spending, improved economic management, a
restructuring of the parastatal enterprise, reform of the tax system, and a reduction of civil
service” (Rakner 2003, 57). These reforms incited food riots and general unrest, primarily along
the Copperbelt. Predictably, President Kaunda backed down.
The main difficulties faced by these attempted structural adjustments were political.
Those interests with the most to lose from economic reform happened to be the base of the UNIP
and Kaunda’s power, since “the costs of almost all the reforms would be borne by urban
consumers including the large party and state bureaucracy created by UNIP, the strong and
centralized trade union movement, and the parastatal enterprises” (Rakner 2003, 59). The
reforms found to be offensive were the government’s commitment to devaluing the kwacha,
lowering imports, reducing price controls on many staples, and imposing foreign exchange
restrictions on Zambian’s personal bank accounts while, at the same time, liberalizing them on
foreign company accounts (Burdette 1988). A particularly unpopular part of the package was the
low 10 percent ceiling placed on wage increases, which led to a series of strikes. The low ceiling
on wage increases threatened and eventually dismantled the decades-long project of the UNIP to
co-opt the labor unions. The labor unions became a bastion against Kaunda’s UNIP and his
attempts to implement economic reforms in line with the IFI’s demands; as a result there were
constant violent outbursts and strikes on the Copper belt. In 1987, the government of Zambia
tried to wean itself from IFI support and announced the New Economic Recovery Program. This
was an attempt by the government to finance its own debt by paying 6.5% of its GDP towards its
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arrears. However, the IFIs and their bilateral donors were concerned that this level was below
10% and cut-off all funding (Rakner 2003). After two years of NERP the government was forced
to go back to the IFIs. The pressure and popular discontent over the economic situation under
UNIP and President Kaunda was too much for the government to overcome, and it ultimately
brought an end to the reign of the UNIP and the end of the one-party, Zambian Second Republic
in 1991.
Difficulties with the trade unions continued even after the election of President Chiluba,
who was the former president of the Zambian Council of Trade Unions (ZCTU). Ironically
however, it was under his two successive administrations from 1991-2001 that IMF reforms were
more aggressively pursued (Craig 2001). With regard to fiscal and monetary reforms, in 1991 the
administration eliminated mealie-meal subsidies, a cash budget was instituted in 1993, in which
government spending was overseen by the Bank of Zambia in order to ensure that funds were
actually available, and also in 1993 a currency auction was established to help control inflation.
With regard to trade, the exchange rate was switched to a market-based rate in 1992 and import
and export quotas were eliminated while the tariff system was simplified and reduced. With the
exception of the cash budget, these fiscal, monetary and trade liberalizations were quickly
implemented and committed to by the Chiluba government. “Zambia could by mid-1994 claim to
have one of the most liberal foreign exchange regimes in Africa,” and “an impressive record in
terms of inflation and fiscal policy” (Rakner 2003, 70).
Policies calling for sectoral reforms, concerning state involvement in agriculture,
manufacturing and mining, as well as reform of the public sector itself, proved to be more
difficult. Public Sector Reform (PSR) was attempted in 1992 when the government dismissed
some 15,000 daily contract workers; these workers did not have the stringent job security
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contracts held by other public sector employees (Rakner 2003). It was the latter job security
contracts that thwarted the government’s attempt to achieve PSR by 1996. Decreasing
government involvement in agriculture proved equally difficult. Almost since the First National
Development Plan the government had been using copper rents to subsidize the agricultural
industry by way of supplying seed and fertilizer as well as establishing prices and marketing
produce. Attempts under the MMD-Chiluba government were made to end these programs, but
severe drought during the 1992-1993 season and lack of private sector investment forced the
government to remain involved in the sector. Following a highly-contested 1996 presidential
election, the Chiluba administration was not as keen on continuing aggressively with economic
restructuring.
In Zambia rent-seeking was harmful to the financial situation of the country in that
interest groups, most notably trade unions, used their political power to demand costly benefits in
subsidies and wage increases. Rent-seeking was also harmful in that these groups also pressured
and prevented the government from implementing economic reform policies that might have
otherwise improved the condition of the economy.
Another problem which hampered the Zambian economy was corruption, which is the
second part of hypothesis 7. The patrimonial nature of the Zambian state that developed after
independence, in which groups, such as the mine workers, were awarded access to the state in
exchange for party loyalty, created a fertile environment for corruption. On the one hand, the
UNIP could use political appointments as payment for support, and on the other the clientelistic
state became a means of achieving personal wealth because of the general lack of economic
opportunities in sectors other than mining. The opportunities for personal enrichment through
political and bureaucratic positions increased as the government was becoming increasingly
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dirigiste at the beginning of the Second Republic. The increasing necessity for businesses to
obtain licenses and permits, such as import and export licenses, foreign exchange permits,
veterinary and agricultural permits, and trade licenses, increased the opportunity for bribes and
favors. One such instance occurred after the government’s implementation of Zambianization,
when it was mandated that citizenship be a prerequisite for ownership of certain enterprises, and
two permanent secretaries were convicted of extorting bribes and favors in return for granting
citizenship (Szeftel 2000).
Despite claims to the contrary, corruption did not cease with the fall of the Kaunda
regime in the early 1990s and the reinstitution of multi-party democracy in the Third Republic.
Having vowed to hold former President Kaunda to account for the corruption that took place
during his tenure from 1964-1991, President Chiluba left office ten years later in 2001 facing
similar allegations. In 2006 the “High Court in London found, in a civil suit brought by the
government of his hand-picked successor, Levy Mwanawasa, that he had stolen $46m from the
state while in power” (The Economist 2009). In the summer of 2010, criminal proceedings
against the former president in Zambia found him not guilty.
The World Bank’s Governance indicators reflect the extent of corruption in Zambia. In
1996 Zambia placed in the 12th percentile with a governance score of -1.07 (with the lowest
possible being -2.5). It is evident that while Zambia is not the worst case of corruption in Africa,
it has experienced many of the same difficulties as other sub-Saharan African countries with
regard to the use of state power and resources to reward political support and accumulate
personal wealth.
In addition to a weak bureaucracy, rent-seeking, and corruption another characteristic of
resource-cursed states, according to theory, is the centralization of political power. The fourth
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political hypothesis concerns the correlation between authoritarian political institutions and
resource-dependent states. Resource-rents, it is argued, enable governments to prevent political
dissension with economically distortionary policies, such as subsidies. The Zambian case is more
nuanced than this. At independence the country was a multi-party democracy with two major
parties the UNIP and the African National Congress (ANC). During the First Republic the UNIP
under the direction of President Kaunda attempted to consolidate its power and maintain its
broad base of support; however, disputes over rent distribution left many factions unsatisfied
with the UNIP. These disputes were violent in some instances, creating an atmosphere of crisis
for the UNIP government. This crisis resulted in President Kaunda’s move to garner more power
by changing the constitution. It was during the Second Republic that Zambia had its brush with
authoritarianism.
The constitution of the Second Republic was signed by the President on December 13,
1972, and approved by the National Assembly’s and UNIPs General Conference on August 25,
1973. It was instituted from the top down by President Kaunda in order to strengthen the
government against the political instability discussed previously. Despite being at its weakest,
the UNIP was able to amend the Constitution of the First Republic because of the elimination of
the provision requiring referenda before a constitutional amendment in 1969. In 1969:
“this provision [for referenda] was unfortunately targeted for repeal early in the life
of the Constitution. It was eliminated by a 1969 amendment and referendum billed as
the ‘referendum to end all referenda’. This repeal was aimed specifically at
facilitating amendments to the rights to property, but its implications were far
broader” (Ndulo and Kent 1996, 264).

The broader implications of this amendment were its use to institute the Constitution of the
Second Republic, whose most significant provision was to establish a one-party democracy.
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Article 4 states: “There shall be one and only one political party in Zambia, namely the United
National Independence Party” and that no person can “form or attempt to form any political
party or organization other than the Party, or to belong to, assemble or associate with, or express
opinion or do any other thing in sympathy with, such political party or organization.” The slogan,
“The Party and Its Government” indicates the new supremacy of the Party over government
(Burdette 1988). The creation of a one-party system strengthened the powers of the executive
against both parliament and the judiciary.
The banning of other political parties opened the door for the state to eliminate organized
political opposition. If certain politicians were found to be overly hostile to the party and its
government, then these officials would be arrested; the judiciary rarely overturned these
imprisonments. When “cases found their way to the courts on writs of habeas corpus…especially
in political cases” the courts “routinely upheld the state’s power to detain individuals without
trial” (Ndulo and Kent 1996, 267). Similarly, Vondoepp (2006, 394) states that in cases tried in
Zambia, “The presence of a major opposition figure decreases the likelihood of an antigovernment decision…This clearly suggests that judges have been hesitant to either upset the
president or be seen as siding with the opposition.” Regarding the role of parliament and its
members under the Second Republic, they were relegated to that of a chamber which gave tacit
consent to the policies formulated by the executive. As Burnell (2003, 57) states, “the MPs’
function is to interpret the official policies and implement government programmes in the
constituencies.” MPs had no independent policy-making role. Essentially, all budget, and
policymaking powers were absorbed by the President and his cabinet who were only responsible
to parliament “collectively”; hence, only under very vague circumstances.
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Following the fall from grace of Kaunda and the UNIP, in 1990 multi-party elections
were held and President Kaunda was removed from the presidency for the first time since
independence. Frederick Chiluba of the Multi-Party Democracy Party (MPD) was elected to the
presidency. Upon his election, the Third Republic was instituted, and unsurprisingly, one of the
significant changes in the new constitution was the amendment requiring the popular election of
the president. However, despite this democratic rise to power, Chiluba did not change much in
the way of limiting executive power and many of the same problems persisted, including the lack
of parliamentary involvement in policymaking and budget allocation. Chiluba even gained
additional power over the budget by way of “the Presidential Discretionary Fund.” Since the late
1990s, this fund has allocated to the president a part of the budget that he may spend according
to his own priorities (Rakner and Svasand 2004).
This history of the One-Party State and the power of the President in Zambia nuances the
predictions of the eighth resource curse hypothesis regarding authoritarianism. The hypothesis
essentially argues that due to resource wealth, resource dependent states can afford to pursue
harmful economic policies such as food subsidies and extensive public services that keep the
populace contented and thereby reduce popular political pressure on government. However,
authoritarian institutions in Zambia resulted from the opposite impetus, i.e., an attempt to control
the intense political competition that emerged from the combination of preexisting social
divisions between ethno-regional groups and the presence of strong labor unions.
The final political hypothesis in the resource curse literature concerns social conflict and
civil war. Unlike Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia has not
experienced civil war; however, it has experienced social conflict that has its roots in the
differing class and tribal-regional groups that existed and formed in the country. This conflict has
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mostly taken place within the political sphere with the government’s response being either
detainment or assimilation through patronage.
The Zambian nationalist movement began under the leadership of Harry M. Nkumbula, a
former schoolmaster, who upon his return from studying at the London School of Economics
joined the Northern Rhodesian African Congress, a political party formed to oppose colonization
in 1948. He became the party’s president in 1951, and the party was renamed the African
National Congress (ANC). The party then began to attract younger more militant followers
(Burdette 1988). In the late 1950s Nkumbula became “the public face of African Nationalism in
Northern Rhodesia” (Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008, 19). It was in 1958 that Nukumbula’s
position was challenged. Younger leaders of the party sensed that Nkumbula was resigned to the
colonial governor’s “gradualist approach to African political advancement” (Gewald, Hinfelaar,
and Macola 2008, 20). Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe broke away from the ANC to
form the Zambia Africa National Congress (ZANC). This movement was quickly outlawed by
the colonial government and its leaders were imprisoned or exiled to remote areas of the country
(Gewald, Hinfelaar, and Macola 2008). Upon his release from jail after nine months, Kaunda
formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP). This began the struggle between ANC
and UNIP for political power, and laid the foundation for how the UNIP would later cope with
political disagreements with rivals.
Kaunda’s UNIP won the first general election with universal adult suffrage in 1964 and
immediately demanded full independence from Great Britain as well as the Federation, which
was granted to Zambia. The UNIP’s political rivalries came from three sources: Nukumbula’s
ANC, the United Party (UP), and intra-party divisions that culminated in the formation of the
United Progressive Party (UPP) under Simon Kapwepwe. The ANC remained strong in Southern
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and Eastern Province and amongst the main linguistic groups of these provinces the Ila, Tonga
and Lenje (Burdette 1988). The second early political threat to the power of the UNIP was the
emergence of the UP under the leadership of expelled UNIP member Alumina Muncie. The UP
was strong in the Western Province. The UP was banned in August 1968 pushing its leaders to
join the ANC and increasing the number of seats held by the ANC in Parliament to 23 to the
UNIP’s 81 (Burdette 1988).
The most significant threat to the UNIP came from intra-party divisions. The divisions
within the party were based on regional/linguistic lines; Kaunda attempted to solve these
disturbances by awarding cabinet and bureaucratic positions to representatives of all groups.
However, these divisions actually intensified over the years of 1967 to 1969, even resulting in
Kaunda’s brief resignation in 1968. The establishment the United Progressive Party (UPP) by
Simon Kapwepwe in August 1971 was the result of five years of heated political competition to
secure control of UNIP (Gewald, Helfaar and Malcoa 2008). Kapwepwe was the former VicePresident of the UNIP. It was Kapwepwe’s UPP that would serve as the last nail in the coffin of
Zambia’s multi-party democracy. In September 1971, all UPP leaders with the exception of
Kapwepwe were arrested and imprisoned for alleged engagement in military training in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Gewald, Kinfelaar and Macola 2008). As mentioned above,
in 1972 Kaunda maneuvered to change the Zambian constitution with the implementation of the
Second Republic and the establishment of a one-party state. Even at the height of the Zambian
one-party state in the 1980s, social conflict did not disappear. In October 1980, eight members of
the governing elite, including Valentine Musakanya, a former governor of the Bank of Zambian,
Edward Shamwana, then a High Court commissioner, Goodwin Voram Mumba, former manager
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of the Industrial Finance Company, and Godfrey Miyanda, an army brigadier general, were
arrested for treason for planning a bloodless coup d’état (Burdette 1988).
While the above mentioned conflicts have been of a regional, political nature, the UNIP
was often confronted with violence from the labor unions. The UNIP’s relationship with the
labor unions was discussed above in the context of rent-seeking; however, the Zambia Congress
of Trade Unions was also a source of social unrest in Zambia especially after the collapse of the
copper industry and the decline in living standards. As with political opposition, the government
resorted to a strategy of detainment or patronage to solve its problems with the unions. Union
leaders were arrested, but the High Court had them released and afterward several union leaders
were offered seats on the boards of directors of parastatal companies (Burdette 1988).
The regional and class divisions in Zambia required the creation of a system of patronage
and suppression in order for the dominant party, UNIP, to stay in power. Social conflict in
Zambia has not been of the type advanced by the ninth resource curse hypothesis, i.e., that
resource rents induce social conflict, such as civil war that in turn produces economic chaos.
Rather than social conflict, there has been social unrest in Zambia due to the discord that
emerged between the dominant party and outside social groups, such as the unions.

3.3 Conclusions

The factors that were important in Zambia’s economic decline are explained in part by the
various resource curse hypotheses. The critical economic variables present in the Zambian case
are the oscillation of the international price of copper, and the lack of linkages between the
copper industry and the rest of the economy. But neither the declining terms of trade nor the
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Dutch disease explanations are relevant to the Zambian case. It is the oscillation of the
international price of copper that is the most important economic explanation for Zambia’s
decline in economic growth. This decline in the copper price destroyed Zambia’s ability to
finance its development goals and eventually put the country into a downwards debt spiral. This
price decline and the effects it had on Zambia’s fiscal situation could have been mitigated by
effective government policies. However, the precarious position of the dominant party’s control
over the political system, coupled with a poor understanding of the volatility of the international
copper market, prevented the Zambian government from implementing needed policies. Instead,
due to political pressures, the government instituted policies that distributed resource rents to
groups demonstrating party loyalty. These policies included import-substitution, nationalization,
and Zambianization.
This socio-political situation also affected the quality of Zambia’s institutions, causing
the bureaucracy to suffer from the clientelistic promotion of bureaucrats and a clientelistic
allocation of state benefits. As a result, rent-seeking and corruption also became important
characteristics of this case. The instability of the political system, compounded by the intense
competition for resource rents, also produced episodes of authoritarianism. In sum, it is the
interaction of the numerous factors advanced by the resource-curse theory that accounts for
Zambia’s problems as a resource-dependent state. It has suffered from commodity price
instability which, in conjunction with a fragmented, neo-patrimonial society, has produced poor
institutions, and dysfunctional government policies that have contributed to a negative feed-back
loop between single resource dependency, institutional weakness and poor economic
performance.
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4: The Case of Botswana
In the eighteenth century, the ancestors of the Tswana tribes migrated from South Africa into
what would become the country of Botswana. These Tswana tribes managed to maintain control
of the territory into the mid-1800s despite the external forces of European colonialism and
invasion attempts by surrounding tribes. The region became a British Protectorate by negotiation
in the late 1800s. The Bechuanaland Protectorate officially received independence from Great
Britain in 1966, and the nation’s independence leaders were the Tswana tribal-elite. The largest
sector of the Botswana economy at independence was agriculture in the form of cattle ranching.
Mining prospecting commenced only shortly before independence, and the mining industry
developed as a collaborative effort between the new state leaders and the multi-national mining
companies, such as De Beers and Anglo-American. In 1967, the first kimberlite diamond pipe
was discovered near Francistown, which is near the border of Zimbabwe, the former Southern
Rhodesia. This discovery of diamonds would significantly transform the country’s economy in
less than a decade into one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Thus, the case of
Botswana is an exception to resource curse expectations.
The only economic hypothesis pertinent to the success of Botswana is price stability. The
third hypothesis regarding the mineral sector enclave has some explanatory power as indicated
by the low level of employment generated by the diamond industry. The fourth hypothesis
regarding the Dutch disease is also relevant, given the decline of the country’s agricultural
sector. The political hypotheses are more helpful in explaining Botswana’s success. Botswana
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has implemented many policies that have been successful in managing its diamond rents, such as
its initial investment in both physical and social infrastructure, its foreign currency savings
funds, its currency management policies, employment of expatriate workers, and its policy of
negotiating with other governments and the private sector. Regarding its institutions, Botswana
has also developed a meritocratic bureaucracy that has driven the government’s economic
policy-making and implementation process. Its strong institutions are also evident in the lack of
rent-seeking and small amount of government corruption. While its efficacious economic
policies and good institutional quality have allowed the economy to avoid the resource curse,
Botswana has experienced authoritarian-like rule despite its maintenance of multi-party
democracy. This authoritarianism stems from the overwhelming dominance of the ruling
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the increasing power of the President. The final political
hypothesis predicting social conflict gains little traction in Botswana; there has been a strong
sense of social cohesion in the country with a higher degree of ethnic homogeneity than that
found in most sub-Saharan African countries.

4.1 Economic explanations

Botswana has been described as a miracle. As Samatar (1999, 1) states, “In sharp contrast to the
failures and disappointments that cloud the rest of Africa, Botswana’s thirty years of
independence have been a time of hope, optimism, and progress.” While much of this African
miracle has been accounted for by good governance, another critical variable in the development
of Botswana’s economy has been the relatively stable price of its primary export—diamonds.
Botswana benefits from its unique relationship with the global diamond cartel, De Beers. As a
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consequence of the De Beers monopoly of the diamond trade, diamond prices are not a result of
market trading as is the case for other minerals such as copper or even precious metals such as
gold. Botswana is the largest diamond producer in the world by carats and value and accounts for
66 % of De Beers’ output (IMF 2007, 22). As a result of its dominance in diamond production,
the international diamond price is determined by the average export value per carat for
Botswana’s diamonds (Iimi 2006). It has been in Botswana’s interest that De Beers keep prices
high and that the company maintained “the myths of high-value, scarcity and permanency
intrinsic to diamond selling” (Good 2008, 24). One could say that Botswana has a monopoly
within a monopoly, which has kept its revenue from diamonds high and stable relative to the
fluctuation of other hard-mineral prices. This steady stream of diamond revenues has been the
driving force behind Botswana’s rapid GDP growth, which averaged 9.3% annually for the
decade 1975-1976 to 1994-1995 (Hope 1998). Table 4.1 shows Botswana’s GDP growth since
independence. Botswana experienced a steady four-fold expansion in diamond rent from the
early-1970s to the early-1990s (Auty 2008). Such an increase in GDP and diamond rent resulted
in an increase in government revenue, as is demonstrated by table 4.2.
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Table 4.1: Gross Domestic Product 1966-2009 BWP
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Its high revenue has enabled Botswana to maintain a unique relationship with the international
donor community in that unlike most of sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world,
Botswana has not needed much IMF or World Bank funding. But while revenues have been
relatively stable because of the stability of diamond demand, “…shifts of plus or minus 15% of
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revenues are fairly typical in Botswana” (Pegg 2009, 15). In times of revenue uncertainty the
government of Botswana has attempted to manage its resources by stockpiling diamonds or
reducing production, as it did in the early 1980s to manage a slump in diamond demand. It is the
possibility of reduced demand that most concerns the government. As Peat (1997, 410) states,
“there is less certainty regarding the sustenance of the diamond market whose buoyancy depends
on affluence arising from good economic performance of major consuming countries such as the
United States, Japan and EU members.” This effect was noticed in 2009 when, as a result of the
financial crisis, Botswana experienced an unprecedented negative growth in GDP of 10.2%.
Despite the rapid expansion of the diamond industry that began just after the
commissioning of the Orapa mine in 1971, the industry did not create much spin-off growth in
the other sectors of the domestic economy, which supports to an extent the third economic
explanation found in the resource curse literature, which states that the nature of extractive
industries is not conducive to generating broader economic growth. One indication of this is the
low level of employment generated by the minerals sector in Botswana. In 1972 the industry
employed around 3500 workers, which represented 9% of formal employment; by 1995
employment in the mining industry stabilized at around 13,000 employees, which accounted for
only 5% of formal sector employment (Peat 1997). The low level of employment in the major
export sector encouraged the government to create public-sector jobs to avoid larger
unemployment numbers. Job creation in the formal sector would have been flat in the mid-1990s
if the government had not boosted employment by 25% (Auty 2001).
The government’s difficulties with unemployment were compounded by the decline of
the agricultural sector and the slow growth of manufacturing. The growth difficulties found in
these sectors raise the question of possible Dutch disease effects. Regarding manufacturing,
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however, this sector has not declined as is predicted by the Dutch disease logic of crowding out.
Manufacturing has more or less consistently accounted for 5% of GDP. The sector experienced
an average growth rate of about 7.6% between 1982/83 and 1988/89, declining to about 3.3% per
annum between 1989/90 and 1994/95 (Mpabanga 1997). The slow growth of the manufacturing
sector is better explained by the many other constraints it faces, including the fact that it is not
integrated into the domestic economy, as revealed by the insignificant amounts of local raw
materials or processed inputs in the sector (Samatar 1999). Other constraints include the small
domestic market, transportation costs, South African trade restrictions on Botswanan exports, the
high costs of utilities, the high costs of labor, the lack of entrepreneurs, the lack of local inputs,
and excessive bureaucratic requirements.
The agricultural sector has, however, experienced a marked decline since independence
in 1966. The sector was growing by 8.3% per annum in the 1970s before the onset of significant
diamond production, but it declined by 1.2% each year in the 1990s (Pegg 2009). The
contraction of the agricultural sector has been attributed both to natural obstacles to the growth
of agriculture in Botswana and the Dutch disease. The natural obstacles include the fact that the
Kalahari desert covers most of Botswana. The country is consequently classified as semi-arid
and is prone to drought. As is common in such climates, cattle-herding is the major agricultural
activity. The percentage of arable land in Botswana, or the area suited to rain-fed crops, is less
than 5 percent (Auty 2001). As for Dutch disease effects, the mechanism blamed is the
strengthening of the Botswanan pula against the South African rand after diamond booms,
causing Botswana’s agricultural products to lose their competitiveness. The government has tried
to overcome these difficulties with the manufacturing and agricultural sectors via a series of
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policy solutions, which leads us into first political hypothesis of the resource curse—the
management of resource rents.

4.2 Political Explanations

As many contributors to the resource curse literature argue, the most important explanation for
the resource curse derives from the first political hypothesis concerning the policies that are
implemented to manage resource rents. Hence, the main question is: “How are mineral rents
used?” Botswana’s policies have earned it the title of a resource-dependent success story. The
country is often portrayed as following relatively liberal economic policies and development
strategies. Among Botswana’s more successful policies are: its initial development of physical
infrastructure, investment in human capital, savings of foreign currency, currency management,
minerals taxation policy, its policy of negotiation with external agents and the formation of
private-public partnerships, and its use of expatriate experts. Since independence, the
government of Botswana has also established state-owned enterprises in attempt to strengthen
the manufacturing and agricultural sectors and as a siphon for excess diamond rents in order not
to exceed the economies absorptive capacity; however these organizations have met with mixed
results.
Two of Botswana’s initial goals for the use of diamond rents were to develop its physical
infrastructure and human capital. In 1966 Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world
with almost no roads, railways, utilities, or schools The BDP government adopted and
implemented a series of development plans focusing on investment in infrastructure, health and
education (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Following from relatively high levels of
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government expenditure, the education system in Botswana has been noted for its success in
achieving high levels of primary school enrollment, high levels of female enrollment, and high
levels of adult literacy. Expansion of the education system has been a goal of the state since
independence. From 1966, education expansion was rapid, from fewer than 80,000 students in
1966 to nearly 400,000 in 1990 (Meyer, Nagel, and Snyder 1993). Primary school enrollment
levels in 2006 were at 89.2% for children aged 6 to 12 and 62.2% for children aged 13-17.
The third policy that illustrates Botswana’s successful rents management has been the
government’s policy of saving, both domestically and in foreign currency reserves. Botswana has
kept substantial reserves of foreign currency, which stood at US$4.9 billion in 1996 (Hope1998).
The government has typically allocated two-fifths of its revenue to offshore investments and
accumulated financial reserves of 125% of GDP (IMF 1999). In 1972 the government created the
Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF) and the Reserve Stabilization Fund (RSF). As its name
implies, the purpose of the RSF was to accumulate reserves that could be used in downturns. The
PDSF has a different role, which has been to safeguard the funds it receives and earns in order to
meet possible future government debt obligations (Faber 1997).
The initial goals of the PDSF were gradually transformed as diamond revenues continued
to grow and became both a device for siphoning government surpluses away from the budget and
a source for funding the capital required by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Faber 1997). By the
mid-1990s, the PDSF was the largest lender in Botswana. The vast majority, 85% of its portfolio,
went to Botswana’s parastatals, and most of that went to the Botswana Housing Corporation
(BHC). The remaining percentages were as follows: 7% of its loans went to local government,
another 7% went to private sector borrowers, and 15% went to educational, training or research
programs (Faber 1997). The problem with the PDSF is that it has become a source of subsidized
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interest rates that has allowed otherwise unprofitable SOEs to produce returns, and for inefficient
management of some SOEs to continue, as will be discussed later in reference to the BHC.
Overall, the PDSF has been less successful than Botswana’s other policies.
Regarding currency management, as a member of the South African Customs Union
(SACU), the government did not even introduce its own currency, the pula, until 1976, after it
began receiving steady income from the diamond industry. At the time, the government saw
membership of the rand currency area as an advantage: it did not have to worry about foreign
exchange constraints since the rand was an internationally respected currency (Samatar 1999).
The pula has been loosely pegged to the rand. Keeping the nominal exchange rate from real
appreciation was one of the major policy objectives of the government, which was achieved in
part by maintaining large foreign reserves (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001). In managing the
appreciation of the pula, the government has hoped to enable economic diversification by
keeping its other tradable sectors competitive. The pula has occasionally been overvalued against
the rand or the dollar, and in some instances, the government has had to sacrifice the
competitiveness of some sectors in order to allow the pula to appreciate to counter inflation. But
the exchange rate has for the most part been stable.
The minerals policy implemented by Botswana’s bureaucracy has been extremely
important for securing mining development for the country and for producing subsequent
resource rents. One aspect of this policy that has been particularly successfully managed has
been the minerals tax and royalties, which for diamond mining are a 10% royalty and 25%
income tax. For other types of minerals the royalty fees are lower: 5% for precious metals and
3% for other minerals. Related policies include a liberal foreign exchange control regime which
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has allowed a relatively free repatriation of dividends and profits, and virtually unrestricted
imports of goods and services (Gaoloathe 1997).
A further important policy implemented by the government to secure its revenue sources,
especially resource rents, is its policy of negotiating with foreign governments and MNCs. There
are many examples in which the government has successfully negotiated such agreements. In
1969 President Khama renegotiated the South African Customs Union agreement to capture
more revenue for Botswana. Also shortly after independence, under the auspices of the Lomé
convention, the Botswana Meat Commission negotiated access to the EEC market, gaining
higher prices for beef exports than would have otherwise been provided by the international
market (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001). Of particular importance has been the
government’s ability to negotiate its relationship with De Beers. In 1975, the government
successfully negotiated an increase in its equity share in its joint venture with De Beers—
Debswana— from 15% to 50% (Good 1992). The government not only has a 50% equity share
in Debswana, but also has a 15% equity share in De Beers itself (other equity holders being
Anglo American and the Oppenheimer family). In 2006, the government and De Beers agreed to
establish the Botswana Diamond Trading Company, another 50-50 joint venture. The
negotiations that ended in 2006 lasted about seventeen months and the resulting agreement gave
De Beers a twenty-five year control of Botswana’s entire diamond production in return for its
partial or complete relocation of the Botswana Diamond Trading Centre (DTC) from London to
Gaborone (Good 2008).
The ability of the BDP government to negotiate and create more beneficial agreements
with external companies and governments is partially due to the government’s use of expatriate
experts. The policy of employing expatriates in the bureaucracy and in SOEs is yet another
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successful aspect of resource rent management. Botswana, like most other newly-independent
African states, did not have a strong class of educated bureaucrats and technocrats. Directly after
independence the civil service was composed mostly by expatriates, who represent 73% of the
civil service. Despite this domination of the bureaucracy by expatriates, President Khama’s
government made it policy not to localize, or indigenize it in any way. President Khama has said
that “…we would never sacrifice efficiency on the altar of localization.” Expressing similar
sentiments, Peter Mmusi, former finance minister and Vice President, noted that “a purposeful
government which acquires the expertise to deal with foreign companies on its own terms need
not have a fear of domination by foreign companies” (Samatar 1999, 81-82). The efficient
operation of Debswana and the consistent expansion of its mining operations are due in part to
this expatriate-friendly policy. Debswana remained under the operational control of Anglo
American Services Ltd for 23 years, before it established its own management structures (Good
and Taylor 2008).
The BDP government also created several organizations and funds to use diamond rents
for economic development. The first such organization, created in 1970, was the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). The purpose of the MFDP was to plan, budget and
oversee all development projects. Samatar (1999) calls the MFDP the “brains trust” of
Botswana’s economic policy, comparable to Japan’s MITI. In the same year the government
created the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) which operates under the umbrella of the
MFDP and is responsible for identifying viable economic opportunities in Botswana and seeking
out potential investors (Samatar 1999). If no investor emerges, then the BDC can use funds to
create the industry itself; enterprises in which the government has 50% or greater equity are
considered subsidiaries of the BDC.
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The Botswana Enterprises Development Unit (BEDU) was created in 1973. Placed under
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the aim of BEDU is to train potential entrepreneurs in
how to acquire finance so as to help develop small and medium enterprise and diversify the
economy. Similarly, the aim of the Financial Assistance Policy (FAP), introduced in 1982, was
to assist small, medium and large-scale domestic firms, in addition to boosting employment. FAP
came as a response to the report on Employment and Labour Use in Botswana that argued that
public agencies were needed to support industrial development and employment (Peat 1997). By
1993 the policy had funded over 4,000 projects and successfully supported the domestic
manufacture of metal (school furniture), school uniforms and protective clothing (Samatar 1999;
Mpabanga 1997). In 2001, BEDU and FAP were consolidated into the Citizen Entrepreneurial
Development Agency (CEDA). The final pertinent organization that was created to use diamond
rents for development was the National Development Bank (NDB), which was created in 1975.
The NDB, acting under the direction of the MFDP, has supported small agriculture and industry
by granting loans to projects considered too risky or too costly to attract private loans (Makgetla
1982). Recently, however, the NBD has experienced problems of corruption, which will be
discussed further below in regards to hypothesis seven.
Regarding hypothesis six concerning institutional quality, Botswana is renowned for the
strength of its bureaucracy and the rule of law. Botswana has a strong executive, which is
primarily a reflection of the powers of the president, which will be discussed later in reference to
the eighth hypothesis regarding authoritarianism. However, it is important to note now that the
strength of the executive has also given the ruling elite a certain autonomy that has arguably kept
economic policy stable. Similarly, the security of the political elite in the country has allowed for
the development of a meritocratic, non-clientelistic bureaucracy.
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Botswana’s administration has the characteristics of a rational Weberian bureaucracy
with a meritocratic recruitment of civil servants and predictable, long-term career rewards
(Evans and Rauch 1999). Its openness to the best recruits without regard for politics has allowed
Botswana’s leaders to implement the country’s development strategy by using expatriate
expertise. The Public Service Commission has remained independent of politics in another sense
as well in that the recruitment of personnel has not been neo-patrimonial. As Von Soest (2009,
14) points out, “Botswana’s four presidents have not used the cabinet as an instrument for the
systematic provision of personal favors.” Carroll and Carroll (1997, 474) also argue that there
exists “a strong commitment to bureaucratic values of service” and public service is not viewed
as an avenue for personal enrichment.
As a result, the Botswana Public Service has garnered strength in the policy-making
process. Indeed, “there has been a tendency for the bureaucracy to dominate the decision-making
process to the point that it has been referred to as bureaucratic ‘paternalism’” (Carroll and
Carroll 1997, 475). This characteristic is also noted by Leftwich (1996, 286): “the developmental
determination of the elite and the relative autonomy of the state have helped to shape very
powerful, highly competent and insulated bureaucracies with the authority to direct and manage
the broad shape of economic and social development.” Another important arm of the
bureaucracy implements minerals policy under the Department of Geology (that assists
companies in conducting minerals prospecting), the Department of Mines (that assists companies
in conducting mining operations), and the Ministry of Minerals Resources and Water
Headquarters which, with the Minerals Policy Committee, drafts policy and handles negotiations
with mining companies.
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The strength of the judiciary is another indicator of institutional strength. In Botswana,
the judiciary is much stronger than that of neighboring countries. Fombad states that “what sets
Botswana apart from most other African governments is the considerable freedom with which
the courts regularly review and invalidate irregular and illegal executive and legislative acts”
(2005, 343). Tsie (1996) gives an example of such an occasion when he discusses the High Court
upholding petitions asserting election irregularities by an opposition party against the governing
party in the mid-1980s. Another example of the court ruling against the government occurred in
September 2001 when it judged that President Ian Khama’s ban on parastatal advertising in two
newspapers, the Midweek Sun and the Botswana Guardian, due to their criticisms of the
President, was unconstitutional. However, the judiciary is not formally autonomous. High court
judges are dependent on the executive for the terms and salaries they receive (Good 2008, 36).
There have also been allegations of corruption within the judicial system.
Generally Botswana is praised for having good governance and low levels of corruption.
The BDP government has rarely been accused of corruption. Botswana is placed in the 68th
percentile for rule of law in the World Bank’s governance index and the in the 80th percentile for
control of corruption. Corruption and rent-seeking have gradually become more serious threats to
the continued growth of the economy of Botswana, as hypothesis seven suggests. Scandals in the
1990s have blemished Botswana’s good record. Both the NDB and the Public Debt Service
Fund, through the troubles at the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC), have experienced
problems of corruption and the misuse of public office for private purposes. There have been
other corruption scandals over land appropriations involving high level officials and cabinet
ministers, as well as issues with the former General of the Botswana Defense Force, and current
President, Ian Khama’s personal use of military aircraft.
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Allegations of corruption at the Botswana Housing Corporation were made in the mid1990s. Two of the major instances that were noted in the Kgabo and Christie reports to the
President about these allegations were the 53 million contract pula with a South African builder
to construct a new headquarters for the BHC, of which P12 million was paid before the contract
was cancelled,, and the plan by the Assistant Minister of Local Government to build 407 highincome homes for personal friends (Good 1994). These scandals involved bribery and fraud and
the misappropriation of at least US$25 million by senior officials and foreign contractors (Hope
1995). The resulting financial troubles prevented the BHC from financing further housing
construction and from meeting its debt obligations to the PDSF.
Another corruption scandal emerged in the mid-1990s in the National Development Bank
(NDB). As was mentioned above, the NDB was to provide financing for firms deemed too risky
by private sector financial institutions. But by the end of 1993 the NDB was nearly bankrupt, and
its accumulated losses totaled P41 million and outstanding loans amounted to P91 million, of
which over one-third were in arrears (Good 2008). It became known that high-level government
officials had received loans but had not been paying them back. The combined debt owed by
these ministers and BDP MPs to the NDB was estimated to be near P30 million (Good 2008).
Occurrences of corruption within two of the largest parastatals in Botswana are troubling for the
country’s record of good governance.
The misuse of government revenue created popular outrage, which resulted in rare
pressure being exerted on the BDP government to respond to citizen unrest. This resulted in the
formation of the Anti-Corruption Campaign Group, made up of church, student groups, trade
unions and the BNF (Botswana National Front) The anti-corruption movement demanded the
creation of an office of ombudsman, a bill requiring members of parliament and government
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officials to declare their interests, and a code of conduct for all parliamentarians. The
government responded by creating the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC)
in 1994 and the Ombudsman in 1995 (Von Soest 2009). The degree of power possessed by these
new organizations is, however, questionable. An example regarding the power of the
Ombudsman arose in reference to the Vice President Ian Khama’s piloting of BDF aircraft. In
2001, the Ombudsman submitted a report on the matter to President Mogae after a member of
parliament complained. The report was ignored by the President and it was not until 2004, when
the matter did not disappear, that the Assistant Minister of Presidential Affairs addressed the
issue before Parliament, stating that the President had authorized the Vice-President to fly BDF
aircraft as commander-in-chief (Good 2008).
As the outbreak of these scandals reveals, corruption could be a growing threat to the
future economic growth and development of Botswana. Nevertheless, to date corruption has not
been particularly widespread, and it has not damaged economic growth, nor has there been much
rent-seeking by social or interest groups. The main reason for the low degree of rent-seeking in
Botswana is the strength and stability of the elite ruling-class. The administrative nature of
British rule in Botswana before independence kept tribal social structures in place and left the
economy extremely underdeveloped and dependent on British aid. The limited colonial rule and
the conservation of pre-colonial tribal society accorded legitimacy to President Khama and
enabled him to form a broad-based coalition. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 23) argue
that “the relative security of elites in Botswana contrasts with the situation in many postindependence African countries where development policies appear to undermine the power base
of traditional political institutions.” Thus colonialism left Botswana in a quite different position
from that of its neighbors, including Zambia. The elite of Botswana benefited from its tribal
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legitimacy and the peasantry continued to respect the new state that had been erected by its old
tribal families helping promote political stability. The relative weakness of the country’s civil
society is indicative of the subservience of social groups to the governing elite. In Botswana
there is no strong trade union movement or many competitive tribal-ethnic groups. Only recently
have discontented groups, such as students and church groups, begun to voice opposition to the
BDP, but these groups have not gained much political power, nor are they lobbying on behalf of
economic interests.
While this legitimacy has allowed the elite to build strong institutions and an effective
economic policy, it has also created constituent complacency and the continuous accrual of
power to the president. The accrual of presidential power is consistent with the eighth resource
curse hypothesis regarding authoritarianism. As this hypothesis suggests, presidentialism could
become increasingly problematic for Botswana despite the fact that there have been no notable
dysfunctional economic policies implemented up to this point, or a consequential slow or
negative growth.
There is the potential, however, for greater political abuse and departure from democracy
in the future. The constitution of Botswana has the potential to produce an executive as strong
those that have emerged in other African states. Fombad (2005, 303) openly questions whether
“the apparent separation of powers provided for in Botswana’s constitution is anything more
than the hegemony of the executive over the other two branches of government.” Botswana’s
electoral democracy has indeed been challenged by very low participation rates, a moribund civil
society, and increasing illiberalism (Good and Taylor 2008). After independence, the BDP
crafted a constitution which called for a British-style Westminster parliamentary system. But the
constitution left considerable power to the executive vis-à-vis parliament and to the ruling party
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vis-à-vis the party in opposition. The strength of the executive branch and its vulnerability to
cooptation by the president has much in common with many other sub-Saharan African regimes.
The lack of constraints on the executive is best illustrated in relation to parliament. The
president is himself a member of the National Assembly. Despite his seat in the Assembly, the
president is no longer popularly elected due to the ratification of a constitutional amendment in
1972. In 1997 another constitutional amendment allowing for the direct succession of the vicepresident to the presidency further increased the distance between the electorate and the
president by removing parliament from the presidential selection process. This amendment has
been controversial, and a 1995 survey found “that 63 per cent of those interviewed supported
constitutional amendments to create a popularly elected president” (Good 2008, 32). After the
1997 amendment President Masire “voluntarily handed over the presidency to Festus Mogae,
who was only recently, on 1 April 2008, succeeded by Ian Khama, son of the country’s first
president” (Von Soest 2009, 10 emphasis in original). The president also has the power to
appoint all other high offices of the executive. The cabinet members maintain their position in
parliament; thus, the president is assured of support for legislation. In addition to appointing
cabinet ministers, the President can appoint four specially elected members to the National
Assembly. This power has been used in the past to maintain high-level officials in office despite
election losses. For example, in 1969 and 1974 Vice President Masire was defeated by Bathoen
Gaseetsiwe, a former chief, and member of the Botswana National Front (BNF), but was
appointed to the Assembly anyway by President Seretse Khama (Good 2008).
With such control over the composition of parliament, the president and the executive
control much of the policymaking process. Fombad (2005, 322) states that “because of the
executive’s ability to ensure that desired legislation is passed, it is fair to conclude that, for all
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intents and purposes, the executive controls parliament.” This control has been demonstrated on
a number of occasions, as when in 1998 BDF soldiers were sent without debate in parliament to
partner with forces from South Africa to invade Lesotho to quell popular discontent over recent
elections. Similarly, a year earlier in 1997, the Assembly had held no debate on the important,
proposed constitutional amendment that allowed for the automatic succession of the vice
president to the presidency (Good, 2008).
Another factor which has added to the powers of the President is the strength of the ruling
Botswana Democratic Party. The BDP has won large majorities in Parliament in every election
since 1965. Table 4.4 lists the percentage of the vote gained and number of Parliamentary seats
won by party for each general election since 1965. As a result the government has always been
formed by the BDP and has shaped all policies implemented in the country since that date.
Despite its overwhelming success in maintaining power, the BDP has experienced close calls in
the national general elections. The closest the BDP has come to losing power was in the 1994
elections, which took place after many of the corruption scandals mentioned above. The
relationship between the BDP and the ever-shifting opposition parties demonstrates that the BDP
has not used its position to outlaw political competition. However, this competition has definitely
been managed and controlled by the BDP.

76

Table 4.3: Number of Parliamentary Seats and Percentage of Popular Vote Won by Party
1965-2009
1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
BDP
28
24
27
29
29
31
27
33
44
45
80.4% 68.4% 76.6% 75.4% 67.9% 64.7% 54.4% 57.2% 51.7% 53.3%
BNF
------- 3
2
2
4
3
13
6
12
6
13.5% 11.5% 13.5% 20.5% 26.9% 37.1% 26.0% 26.1% 21.9%
BPP
3
3
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
14.2% 12.1% 6.6% 7.5% 6.6% 4.5% 4.2% 0%
1.9% 1.4%
BIP/IFP 0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4.6% 6.0% 4.8% 4.3% 3.0% 2.4% 2.8% 0%
0%
0%
BCP
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 1
1
4
11.9% 16.6% 19.2%
BAM
------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- 0
0
1
4.7% 2.8% 2.3%
Indep
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1.9%
Total
31
31
32
32
34
34
40
40
57
57
Source: Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, Botswana Election Archive

The strength of the President and his party has resulted in political and economic policy
stability. The Botswana governing class created “a ‘typical’ developmental state situation, where
the bureaucracy and the ruling party meshed” (Good and Taylor 2008, 756). This developmental
state situation is similar in some respects to the cohesive-capitalist development regime type
(Kohli 2004), or what has been described as the East Asian model of development, in that there
is agreement about policy goals between the state and capital, a strong technocratic bureaucracy
that is allied with private enterprise, and authoritarian, centralized executive power. Institutions
that are protective of private property and support capitalist accumulation have been developed
by this developmental state. It was in the interest of the political elite of Botswana to establish a
more-or-less capitalist regime. Consequently, the authoritarian nature of Botswana’s democracy
has not caused low economic growth, but has in many ways supported economic growth.
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The last political hypothesis posits that social conflict is an important cause of the poor
economic growth found in many resource-dependent states. As observed above, social cohesion
and trust in Botswana are comparatively high. As Samatar (1999, 6) states, “The cohesion of the
dominant class and its single-minded pursuit of economic growth is one of the features that
distinguish this class from their counterparts on the continent.” This is in part due to the unusual
colonial experience that left pre-colonial social structures largely untouched. “The relatively
integrative nature of the Tswana institutions and the lack of colonialism seem to account for the
current relative homogeneity of Botswana” (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 10). The
dominance of the Tswana, an ethno-linguistic group, has led to a relatively homogeneous society
in which 85% of the population speaks Setswana, which is the language of the Tswana tribes.
The Tswana dominate the eight tribes that control the country. The Bamangwato, the tribe of
Seretse Khama, is one of the eight tribes ruled by the Tswana, which occupies the largest
territory of the eight tribes (Leith 2006).
In the 1965 elections, Khama led the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) against the
Botswana Peoples Party (BPP). Unlike many other African parties at independence, the BDP and
Khama were not pushing for independence, as “Khama’s views were not those of African
nationalism expressed elsewhere” (Good and Taylor 2008, 753). The BPP was the more radical,
pro-independence party. An important reason for the success of the BDP was the support it
received from the tribal chiefs. As Tsie (1996, 602) states, “The majority of chiefs were worried
and frightened by the radical stand of the BPP on many political issues, especially the future of
the institution of chieftainship.” The BDP formed an important political alliance that has lasted
since independence, and has only recently begun to fragment. Khama and the BDP attracted all
of the politically significant groups, such as the educated elite, the traditional authorities, the
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cattle farmers, and the rural population (Von Soest 2009). The assimilation of the chiefs was one
of the party’s more important achievements. This coalition integrated within the party the
traditional rural structures of loyalty between commoners and chiefs (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson 2001). At the same time, however, by being incorporated into the state structure, the
chiefs were effectively subordinated to the state. Being at least somewhat based in the traditions
of Botswana themselves, the state held legitimacy for most of the country’s population.
This legitimacy has resulted in an amazingly low demand for ethnic representation at the
national level, or for ethnic distribution of government resources compared to other African
countries. Reiterating a previous point regarding the country’s weak civil society, the Botswana
elite is mostly free from civil society pressure. In Botswana political activism seems to take place
at the local, grassroots level. Molutsi and Holm (1990, 334) state that “activists at the local level
use community meetings…to legitimize criticism of the government,” and that “the focus is
different from a pluralist system in that citizen mobilization deals with local problems rather than
the national allocation of resources.” It is understood at the national level that many policies,
especially those directly affecting the local level, must be vetted at the local level to be
considered legitimate. This emphasis on local political discussion derives from the Tswana
tradition of the tribal meetings called kgotlas. The kgotla is simply a gathering of the adult males
of the tribe to discuss issues with the chief. However, the argument that the kgotla is an efficient
means of expressing political criticism is questioned.
While the ability of the kgotla to appease political concerns at the local level is uncertain,
what is certain is that social strife in Botswana has been rare. In the mid-1990s, political
discontent with the BDP status quo grew. On 16 February 1995, riots in the capital city of
Gaborone erupted as a reaction to the perceived cover up in the Mochudi village of the ritual
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murder of a 14 year-old girl. The alleged perpetrators had been arrested and released due to lack
of evidence; however, secondary school students in the village and in Gaborone were incited by
what they perceived to be inaction by the government to protect them from such murders. In
Gaborone, the protest quickly escalated into a riot when University of Botswana students and
unemployed citizens joined the march. The protestors stormed Parliament, damaging private and
public property, and were confronted by the Special Support Group of the police (Molomo
2001). The unrest of the students and other citizens continued for the following few days,
resulting in violent clashes between the police and BDF and the protestors. This riot has been
interpreted as being more than a reaction to the murder of the 14 year-old girl, and as a sign of
underlying discontent with the BDP. Good (2008, 4) argues that “overall conditions of ‘negative
peace’ or tacit underlying conflict exist in the inequitable society.” In accordance with Good’s
statement, there are underlying social difficulties in Botswana, such as unemployment, and
growing income inequality, but these difficulties for the most part have not resulted in social
conflict, with the above exception, and are being expressed within the political arena.

4.3 Conclusions

The success of the Botswanan economy can be explained in part by resource curse hypotheses.
The stability of the international price of diamonds has played a considerable part in the
remarkable GDP growth experienced by the country. The argument of the third hypothesis, that
the weak linkages between the mineral sector and other sectors of the economy accounts for the
negative or slow growth experienced by many resource-dependent countries is not supported by
the Botswanan case. The minerals sector in Botswana was not integrated into the domestic
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economy, yet the economy still grew. Similarly, the Dutch disease argument is not supported by
Botswana because although the country’s agricultural sector contracted due to Dutch disease
effects, the overall economy still grew. For the most part, the avoidance of resource curse effects,
as well as the high-growth rate, in Botswana has been due to political factors. It is clearly the
case from the evidence that negative resource-dependency effects have been countered in
Botswana by far-sighted, long-term policies contingent in turn on strong institutions and a stable
political environment. Stable politics in Botswana have been underpinned by a relatively strong
sense of social cohesion due to the pre-colonial roots of the state. This social cohesion has
resulted not just in political stability and strong political institutions but also in effective
economic policies for managing resource rents such as investment in infrastructure and savings
funds.
The strong institutions include a meritocratic bureaucracy that has not generally been
prone to corruption and that has directed and implemented development policy. An authoritarianlike democratic regime evolved in Botswana under the continued dominance of the BDP and the
strengthening of presidential powers. This centralized political power resulted from the
indifference of the people of Botswana towards politics. But while the ninth resource curse
hypothesis suggests that authoritarianism weakens the economy of resource-dependent nations,
in Botswana it strengthened the capacity of the government to pursue its economic development
plans. Finally, due to its social cohesiveness Botswana has not experienced civil war, and even
riots and marches have been uncommon.
The interaction effects of the critical variables in the Botswanan case have created a
positive feed-back loop between the relative price stability of diamonds, a cohesive society and
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strong political elite, and strong institutions able to formulate and implement efficient economic
policies.
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5: General Conclusions

President Kenneth Kaunda aptly summarized Zambia’s experience with the resource curse when
he said, “We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a cooper spoon in our
mouths.” Zambia encountered many of the effects attributed by the resource-curse literature to
single resource dependency: dramatic price fluctuations, the low level of integration of its
minerals sector with its domestic economy, a mismanagement of resource rents, weak political
institutions, rent-seeking, corruption, and modest instances of authoritarianism and social
pressure. But nuancing the resource-dependency approach, not all of these factors, including the
enclave nature of Zambia’s copper industry, the authoritarianism, and the instances of social
conflict were devastating for the Zambian economy.
In Botswana, fluctuations in the diamond price were not problematic for the government,
but weak linkages between the diamond industry and the broader economy, as well as certain
Dutch disease effects have created difficulties for the government. Nevertheless, the economy
has still grown despite these effects and contrary to the expectations of hypotheses three and
four. Regarding political explanations, the government has better managed its resource rents than
might have been expected, developed stronger institutions, experienced little rent-seeking or
corruption, and has encountered little social conflict. Botswana has, however, developed a very
strong presidency with authoritarian characteristics.
Using Mill’s method of agreement, five of the nine major explanations provided by the
resource curse literature account for most of the difference between the economic outcomes of
Zambia and Botswana. These five hypotheses are: (2) price stability, (5) rent management, (6)
strength of political institutions, (7) rent-seeking and corruption, and (9) social conflict. These
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five have significantly differed between the two cases. The fourth hypothesis regarding the
Dutch disease is also different between the two cases; however, since the suggested negative
effects of the Dutch disease existed in Botswana and not Zambia, the Dutch disease itself cannot
explain the difference in outcome between the two. The three hypotheses that reveal similarities
between the two cases are (1) declining terms of trade, (3) weak linkages between the minerals
sector and the rest of the economy, and (7) authoritarianism. Returning to table 2.1 we can
illustrate these conclusions with a simple appraisal of the effects of each of these hypotheses by
country.

Table 2.1: Resource Curse Hypotheses and Their
Degree of Presence in Botswana and Zambia

H1: Declining Terms of
Trade
H2: Price Volatility
H3: Weak Linkages
H4: Dutch Disease
H5: Rent Mismanagement
H6: Weak Institutions
H7: Rent-seeking and
Corruption
H8: Authoritarianism
H9: Social Conflict

Botswana
0

Zambia
0

0.5
0.5
0.5
0
0
0.5

1
1
0
1
1
1

0.5
0

0.5
0.5

As indicated earlier, the declining terms of trade explanation for the resource curse is not
supported by the evidence simply because there has not been an overall downward trend in the
prices of copper or of diamonds. However, there has been great volatility of the price of copper,
which corresponded directly with the fiscal difficulties of the Zambian government in the way of
decreased revenue and increased debt. This erratic relationship between government revenue,
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debt and copper prices began when copper prices dropped in the mid-1970s, undermining the
ability of the Zambian government to manage its affairs. Botswana, on the other hand, has
benefited from a unique relationship with the diamond cartel, De Beers, which has sought to
manage supply and demand in the international diamond market, resulting in more stable prices.
The importance of high and stable diamond prices to the Botswana economy has been evident at
various points in its history. One point occurred in 1980 when diamond prices did experience an
uncharacteristic decline. This fall caused a similar decline in government revenue. While this fall
in prices did not last long, the stability of diamond prices has become increasingly uncertain
because more countries have begun exploiting newly discovered reserves outside of the De Beers
cartel and because of the recent global recession. These two cases reveal the importance of the
second hypothesis, commodity price stability, for a government’s ability to overcome the
resource curse effects.
The effects of the weak linkages of the mining sector to the broader economy that has
been experienced in both countries, as well as the Dutch disease in the case of Botswana, have
made it difficult for Zambia and Botswana to diversify their economies. In Zambia the dual
nature of the mining industry was established before independence when the British South Africa
Company created an industrialized mining sector that was surrounded by subsistence agriculture.
Since colonialism, Zambia’s manufacturing sector has not expanded much into the production of
exportable capital or consumer goods. It has continued to produce supplies for the mineral sector
and some domestic consumer goods. The relatively consistent growth of the manufacturing
sector complicates simple assertions of Dutch disease effects. In Botswana the enclave nature of
the minerals sector is indicated by the low level of employment generated by the diamond
industry. Also, similar to the Zambian case, Botswana has been unable to diversify its economy.
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Its manufacturing sector has oscillated between 3% and 5% of GDP, while its agricultural sector
has declined since independence, in part due to Dutch disease effects with the rise of the pula
making Botswana’s agricultural products uncompetitive. In comparing the experiences of each
country with regard to the four economic hypotheses, the second hypothesis, price stability, is the
only one on which the cases have diverged significantly.
While only one of the economic hypotheses has been shown to be significant in
accounting for the difference in outcome between Zambia and Botswana, four of the five
political hypotheses are significant. The first of these regards rent-management policies. Initially,
directly after independence both Zambia and Botswana used their resource rents to build
physical and social infrastructure. These infrastructural programs were successful and aided their
economic growth by building roads, railways, and schools. After its initial success with
constructing infrastructure, the economic situation in Zambia began to decline. This decline was
due in part to the loss of copper revenue because of the drop in copper price mentioned
previously. However, it was also due to the policies implemented, and policies that were badly
needed but were not implemented, by the Zambian government. In contrast, much of the
Botswana’s success was due to the formulation and implementation of productive economic
policies.
The first policy that Zambia needed was the conservation of resource rents in a reserve
fund. The government of Zambia had established a foreign currency reserve fund, but after the
fall in copper prices it quickly went through its reserves. In Botswana, the government created
two such funds, the Public Debt Service Fund and the Revenue Stabilization Fund. By 1998, the
Botswanan government had saved US$6 billion that allowed for three years of import cover. The
government’s goal was not to spend all of its resource revenues and not to use resource revenues
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to pay for recurrent budget spending. The second policy that Zambia needed was a policy of
exchange rate control. The government of Botswana implemented exchange rate controls that
helped control inflation, but the Zambian government failed to control its currency and
subsequently inflation as well.
Regarding the unsuccessful policies implemented by the Zambian government, the first is
import-substitution policy. This policy only managed to substitute the importation of final
products for the inputs of the previously imported goods. Ultimately import-substitution resulted
in an unproductive use of Zambia’s foreign currency reserves and acted as a drain on its copper
revenues. The second policy that was poorly implemented by the Zambian government was
minerals taxation, which directly affected the generation of resource rents. The new government
after independence was reluctant to change the minerals tax system due to its distrust of the
mining multinationals, Anglo American and the Rhodesian Selection Trust. The policy was
eventually changed after years of fruitless negotiations and conflict with the MNCs. In contrast,
the government of Botswana did not inherit a vibrant mining industry at independence, and was
therefore free to establish its own tax system, which it did quickly. It established a 35% royalty
and income tax rate which has been kept relatively steady ever since.
Nationalization of its major industries was another policy of the Zambian government
that ended as a drain on state revenue. The mining industry was nationalized in 1969, but the
negotiation process between the Zambian government and MNCs revealed its inability to
establish and pursue consistent policy goals. This inability resulted in the subsequent
nullification of the negotiated contracts, which had kept the industry under foreign management,
in 1973. This abrogation of the managerial contracts had three major consequences: it essentially
depleted all of the country’s foreign currency reserves; it gave government complete
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responsibility over the industry (i.e. for reinvestment purposes, the marketing of copper, etc.),
making the country even more dependent on the health of copper prices; and it provoked the
departure of valuable expatriate managerial experience at a pivotal point in the development of
the Zambian copper industry, when such expertise was badly needed due to the shift of
production to deeper and lower quality orebodies.
While Zambia inherited a relatively strong and more industrial economy, Botswana had
only its cattle industry to nationalize (which it did) at independence. The governing elite of
Botswana sought to develop its mineral sector along with cattle and allowed multinationals to
prospect for minerals throughout the country. In 1967, as had been suspected, diamonds were
found at what is now the Orapa diamond mine. After this discovery, the government worked
with De Beers to establish a joint venture company named Debswana. Debswana was at first a
15%-85% equity share with the government owning the 15%. Through the years Botswana
continued to negotiate with De Beers and earned a 50%-50% partnership and eventually the
government gained a 15% share in De Beers itself. By embracing a policy of public-private
negotiation with De Beers from the outset, the government benefited from De Beers financing,
expertise and position within the international diamond market; as a result, Botswana’s diamond
industry has not become a drain on its financial resources as the copper industry has in Zambia.
One risk of nationalization is the creation of an extensive system of bureaucratic
organizations, parastatals and state-owned enterprises that will deplete government finances.
This certainly happened in Zambia with the formation of its industrial parastatal holding
company, INDECO and its major subsidiary, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. Similarly,
Botswana established many parastatals that were coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning (MFDP) and its equivalent to INDECO, the Botswana Development
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Corporation (BDC). It is possible that in leaner times this sizeable parastatal complex in
Botswana could become a strain on the Botswanan economy, as it has more generally in Zambia.
The final policy difference between the countries that became important for the
productive use of mineral revenues was the policy of localization in which governments decided
to hire citizens over non-citizens. Zambia implemented a policy of localization known as
“Zambianization” that ultimately ended in the continued and chronic mismanagement of copper
revenues. The goal of this policy was to include more Zambians in the country’s economy and
was not limited only to the public sector; however, the policy became a means for the
government to use the public sector as a source of jobs. This has increased the government’s
recurrent expenditures to pay for public sector salaries. Also, as a result of Zambia’s scarcity of
skilled labor and technocratic expertise, the economy was in need of expatriate experience;
however the Zambianization policy scared such assistance away. This result was anticipated by
the government of Botswana and it therefore introduced the opposite policy, which was to recruit
expatriate workers, especially to bureaucratic and management positions. This policy was
especially useful in the creation of a strong technocratic class in Botswana. Botswana also used
expatriates to renegotiate the South African Customs Union that led to the country’s receiving
more revenue, and it used expatriates in its negotiations with both the European Economic
Community and De Beers.
Rent management and economic policies were definitely important factors in the collapse
of the Zambian economy, where they were dysfunctional and unproductive, and for the growth
of the economy of Botswana, where they were successful. Additionally, the contrasting quality
of the political institutions in Zambia and Botswana is also important in explaining the different
outcomes, feeding into the contrasting nature of critical public policies in the two countries. As
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discussed, institutional quality is indicated by a wide variety of measures such as the strength of
the executive, the parliament, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy. In the analysis above, the
strength of political institutions, specifically the bureaucracy and the judiciary, was considered a
strong indicator of institutional quality when investigating hypothesis six. Corruption and rentseeking, and authoritarianism, also measures of institutional quality, were discussed as separate
hypotheses. Zambia suffers from a weak bureaucracy with neo-patrimonial promotion practices,
and poor policy implementation due to a clientelistic allocation of state resources and a lack of
expertise. The associated problems are exemplified by the attempted agricultural reform, when
the creation of the Credit Organization of Zambia led to the distribution of loans to peasant
farmers and regions according to party loyalty. By contrast, Botswana has developed a more
Weberian-type bureaucracy with meritocratic promotion and strength in the policy-making and
implementation. Table 5.1 presents a comparison of the World Bank’s regulatory quality
indicators, which measure the perceptions of the government’s ability to implement sound
development policies.

Table 5.1: Regulatory Quality: Botswana and
Zambia Compared
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Regarding the strength of the judiciary and the rule of law, Zambian courts have been
found to be less likely to rule against the government in cases brought against the government or
governmental officials. The ruling party amended the Constitution in order to solidify its power
with the creation of the Second Republic in 1972. While the judiciary in Botswana has been
found to be more independent because its courts have ruled against the government in highly
controversial cases, the government does have significant influence over the judiciary in other
respects. Table 5.2 shows the comparison between the Zambian and Botswanan judiciaries, as
measured by the World Bank’s rule of law indicator.

Table 5.2: Rule of Law: Botswana and Zambia
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Zambia has had more trouble than Botswana in avoiding rent-seeking and corruption and
consequently their adverse consequences for its economy. The pressure exerted by unionized
workers, most importantly the mining unions, has been detrimental for the Zambian economy.
The unions pressed the government to continue to provide urban food subsidies and wage
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increases long after these demands were no longer economically viable. These demands required
the government to pursue a balancing act between engaging with the International Financial
Institutions and placating the miners. In Botswana, by contrast, the mining industry was only
established after independence and consequently, the mining unions were not strong enough to
demand large government concessions. Additionally, the government took active measures to
counter the unions. Social pressure exerted on the Zambian government by unions and other
social and interest groups encouraged the creation of a neo-patrimonial, clientelistic state in
which corruption became more widespread and extended to the highest office in the country,
with allegations of presidential embezzlement against former President Chiluba. Botswana has
also experienced cases of corruption, but not rent-seeking. The cases of corruption in the
Botswana National Development Bank and the Botswana Housing Corporation amounted to no
more than pula 150 million, compared with the allegations against President Chiluba, which is
just one of many corruption cases in Zambia, of misappropriating US $46 million. Table 5.3
shows a comparison of the World Bank corruption control indicator between Zambia and
Botswana.
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Table 5.3: Control of Corruption: Botswana and
Zambia Compared
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The single political hypothesis that is not a plausible factor in accounting for the
divergence between the Zambian and Botswana cases is the authoritarianism hypothesis. These
regimes have very similar political systems in which an almost invincible presidency has
emerged. The presidents of Zambia and Botswana have rarely been challenged by their
parliaments or questioned by their electorates. In Zambia an authoritarian phase began in 1972
with the introduction of the one-party state of the Second Republic, and lasted until 1990. During
this period, the country remained under the control of the UNIP and President Kaunda used
detainment or assimilation tactics to suppress political opposition. In Botswana a one-party state
has never been officially established; however, the BDP has won every election since
independence. The position of president has gradually accumulated power and become less and
less connected to the electorate following the constitutional amendment that allows for the
automatic succession of the vice president. Despite their authoritarian tendencies, these regimes
have not followed the logic of the resource curse hypothesis regarding authoritarianism, which
predicts that resource rents enable governments to mollify dissent that leads to distorted
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economic policies and poor growth. While Zambia has experienced poor economic growth,
Kaunda’s establishment of a one-party state was a reaction to political instability in the country,
which is contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis. In Botswana’s case gradual
presidentialization was the result of stability and a placated electorate, which is the path to
authoritarianism and poor economic growth predicted by the resource curse hypothesis; however,
Botswana’s economic growth has not been affected by its authoritarian tendencies.
Political stability in Botswana leads to the final political hypothesis accounting for the
difference with Zambia. Zambia has a more diverse tribal composition. Consequently regional
politics are more important and create tension at the national level. Zambia also has a larger,
more concentrated urban population which has facilitated a strengthening of the labor movement,
which has been another source of instability. Labor unions have rioted on occasion to push for
higher wages. Many of those riots occurred just before the establishment of the one-party state
when members of opposing parties, such as the UP and the UPP, also clashed with UNIP
members. After the declaration of the one-party state, opposition leaders were simply detained or
co-opted. Just before the collapse of the one-party state, and during attempted economic reforms,
these groups rioted and clashed again. Civil society in Zambia is stronger, although more
fragmented, than in Botswana and as a result the country has experienced more conflict between
these groups. In Botswana, the strong tribal institutions of the Tswana have maintained precolonial and pre-independence social cohesion between peasants and the elite. There has only
been one riot in Botswana’s history, which occurred in 1995, and was due to the sentiment of
young people that they were not being protected by the state, as well as to dissatisfaction among
the unemployed. Despite recent dissatisfaction with the BDP, the party that was formed by the
Tswana elite continues to be elected.
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The cases of Zambia and Botswana show that the pessimistic correlation between
resource-dependency and economic growth in developing countries can be avoided if social and
institutional structures are conducive. The difference between these cases was not explained by
the declining terms of trade hypothesis because it was not evident that copper or diamonds had
suffered from an overall negative price trend. Nor was the difference between these two cases
explained by the enclave nature of their minerals sectors, Dutch disease, or authoritarianism,
because both experienced to varying degrees the presence of each of these mechanisms. The
success of Botswana has depended on the interaction effects of five variables: the price stability
of the resource (diamonds); social cohesion; the strength of the institutions built on this social
foundation; the formulation and implementation of economic policies that used resource rents
wisely by saving them and investing them appropriately; and the absence of pressures and
problems associated with rent-seeking and corruption. Despite facing some challenges, the result
has been an exemplary, if difficult to emulate, case of resource-dependent economic
development.
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